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The nation of Nigeria, located in sub-Saharan West Africa, 
was considered one of the former European colonies possessing the 
potentials after its independence in 1960 to develop itself as 
both a viable political as well as economic system. The attri­
butes so often identified with such successful developmental ef­
forts of nations in the past--abundant human and natural resourdes-­
were the positive factors political scientists and economists 
considered as being of primary importance if the full potentials 
of Nigeria were to be realized. 
However, the road towards the economic and political devel­
opment of Nigeria has not been an easy one due to several miti­
gating factors, including the colonial heritage of that nation, 
the prevalence of ethnic divisions within its economic and pol­
itical institutions, and the misallocation of resources and pri­
orities in the dev�lopmental schemes since independence. The 
height of the ethnic divisions culminated in the attempted seces­
sion of the Eastern state in 1965 which was followed by five years 
of civil war with the result that although the physical boundar­
ies of the nation were preserved, the military felt it necessary 
to intervene in the political process with the result that it has 
been military men who have d�rected the subsequent development 
efforts within Nigeria since 1970. 
The concern of this paper is in evaluating the military 
regimes of the 1970s within Nigeria as agents of aevelopment, 
to try and to determine if in effect economic and political 
development has taken place throughout the decade, keeping in 
mind the close correlations between the two areas of development 
as espoused by several social scientists, most prominently Sey­
mour Lipset. The primary orientation of the paper· is towards 
the economic development plans of the 1970s and how effectively 
they have been at improving the Nigerian economic system with 
an emphasis on economic development as merely opposed to economic 
growth. Thus what data .was studied was that concerned with the 
creation of the economic infrastructures considered so essential 
as conduits of economic development as well as the other infra­
structures such as education, transportation, and communications, 
which also serve as promoters of both economic as well as poli­
tical development. 
The conclusions reached upon researching the economic data 
and the implementation of the three economic development pro-
grams since Nigerian independence were that while significant 
economic development has occurred, particularly during the 1970s, 
serious �roblems remain. The overestimation of petroleum as a 
sole financer of the economic development schemes of the nation 
initially caused tremendous overspending by the governments, and 
agricultural prodµction has steadily declined to the point where 
' . 
Nigeria must now import one billion dollars worth of basic foodstuffs 
annually, yet only thirty percent of its arable land is presently 
under cultivation. Shortages in highly-skilled manpower prevails 
as does a lack of administrative and managerial personnel. The 
transportation infrastructure needs extensive updating and suffers 
from a combination of maladies including a lack of capital invest-
ments as well as poor management. 
It does appear that the military regime which seized power 
in a bloodless coup in 1975 was more in tune with the real needs 
and capabilities of the Nigerian economic system and the last 
five years have seen a more realistic approach towards economic 
planning. Industrialization is taking place and more invest­
ments are being steered towards agriculture and education, al­
though ·a disproportionate share of the annual budgets are de­
voted towards military spending. Inflation rates have been cut 
in half and because of Nigeria's vast oil deposits, the nation 
remains in a fairly good position in the international trading 
arena. 
The political development of the nation also appears to have 
taken place with .. the scheduled return to a civilian government 
with the election in September, 1979· While many social scien­
tists have adopted a jaundiced view of past promises by military 
men to return to the barracks, survey data does indicate that 
since 1967 there has been a conscious effort by the military to 
incorporate civilians into top-level administrative and decision 
making positions, and in fact, military men occupy only the very 
top level political positions at the federal level and the govern­
orships at the state levels. Whether the transfer to a civilian 
· government occurs smoothly will probably depend more on the con­
tinued prevalence of ethnicity in both economic as well as pol­
itical institutions than on any preference by the military to 
remain in power. The potentialities of the Nigerian nation re­
main very considerable, but whether true economic and political 
-�-
development has occurred in the 1970s, and how effective the mil­
itary has been as the agents of those developmental efforts, will 
be easier to evaluate if and when a civilian government has had 
its own opportunity to pursue further developmental schemes in 
the ensuing years following the September elections. 
I. Introduction: 
•' 
1 . .. The Orientation of This Study: 
With the impending return to a civilian government in 
Nigeria scheduled for September, 19?9, perhaps now is the time 
to reflect upon the performance of the interim military govern­
ment, which has been responsible for directing the economic de-
, 
velopment of that state during the decade of the 1970s. Nigeria, 
located in sub-Sahaian West Africa, has in the past often-been 
viewed by both political scientists and economists as being one 
of the former European colonies in Africa which possessed the 
chance for a very promising future, particularly when considered its 
many potentials. The characteristics so often associated with 
successful economic developmental efforts in the past history 
of other count�ies--abundant natural resources, a large population, 
access to both inland as well as overseas commercial trading 
�outes--all were, and remain, as positi�e factors within the 
Nigerian economic developmental capabilities. However, since 
that state's independence in 1960, the road towards economic de­
velopment has not been an easy one, and many major obstacles 
-�-
have presented themselves, obstacles either not considered at all 
by those social scientists concerned with Nigerian economic de­
velopment� or even if considered, dismissed by both Western as 
well as non-Western planners who have been involved in the post­
independence economic development of that nation. 
Of cours� the problems involved in the economic development 
of Nigeria, and the varrous ramifications surrounding such an 
expansive undertaking, are not merely economic in nature, but 
due to the particular circumstances and history of this West 
African nation, are necessar�ly also cultural and political. Ni- · 
geria, like all of the other former European colonies, faced 
acute problems in the immediate post-independence era due to the 
effects of the extended period of colonial subjugation, problems 
which in the post-colonial era would affect subsequent develop­
mental efforts.by various types of regimes in various nations. 
What this paper will attempt to do is to evaluate the efforts 
unde�taken in the 1970s within Nigeria towards the development of 
its economic system; efforts which have taken place under the 
auspices of a military government throughout the nine years to be 
considered (1970-1979)• keeping in mind· the various·s�cio-economic 
and political factors which have affected this massive undertaking. 
In essence then, what this paper represents, is an attempt to 
judge one of the newly emerging, and potentially wealthy, nations 
of the sub-Saharan African continent. 
Thase particular years are being considered because they are 
the first ones in which it has really been Nigerians making the key 
-J-
economic as well as political decisions regarding the course of 
development to pursue. The immediate years after independence 
were ones of neo-colonialism, then the 1965 Civil War disrupted 
any attempts at comprehensive long-range economic planning, so it 
really has only been during these last nine years that we have 
observed the independent nation of Nigeria attempting to over-
\ 
come its century of colonial economic suppression and develop and 
maintain itself as a viable economic and political system. With 
the return to a civilian government in September of this year, 
this period under study represents almost a solid decade of ef­
forts upon the part of a military regime to implement policies 
which its planners have felt would best promote economic devel­
opment. While no real effective period of Nigerian civilian 
rule has in the past been established upon which to compare the 
efforts of the military, this evaluation will be useful when in 
the future attempts are made to evaluate the developmental ef­
forts pursued by subsequent civilian governments. 
2. The Relationship Between Economic and Political Development a 
The major concern of political scientists when studying 
the-development of nations has often in the past been.confined 
within the more familiar area of the specifics of political de­
velopment and various authors have come to accept some basic 
premises which are considered the guidelines towards promoting 
political development. According to Claude Welch, the process of 
political modernization has three major characteristics including 
-"f'-
the followings 
(1) An increased concentration of power in the hands of 
the national government, accompanied·by the weaken­
ing of traditional sources of �uthorityJ 
(2) The differentiation and specialization of political 
institutions and structuresi 
(3) The increased popular participation in politics and 
a greater identification of individuals with the 
political system as a whole. (Welch, 1971, p. 7). 
These criteria put forth by Welch and others are based on 
the theory that political development means a movement towards a 
form of government considered to be democratic in nature. Seymour 
Lipse·t further contends that the most common generalization link­
ing political systems to other aspects of a society has been 
that democratic forms of government are directly related to cer­
tain levels of economic development. He feels that certain le­
vels of affluence are often necessary if a society is to be able 
to realize both a mass as well as intelligent participation in 
the political proces�es. (Lipset, 1962, p. 31). Lipset also con­
tends that increased levels of personal wealth and education 
which accompany economic development also serve democracy by 
increasing the lower classes' exposure to cross-pressures which 
in turn reduces these class commitments to given ideologies and 
make them less receptive to extremist ones. (Lipset, 1962, p. 50). 
Increased wealth also changes the shape of the social stratifica­
tion structure from an elongated pyramid with a large lower class 
base, to a diamoi\u s!'1Ci..1Jcj wl th a growing middle class. If enough 
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wealth is available for general distribution throughout the en­
tire society, then acceptance of a political opposition by those 
presently in power also becomes more of a reality to both in­
dividuals as well as gr oups. 
At the same time that individuals were bec oming m ore re­
ceptive t o  the idea that in fact there were some c orrelations 
' 
bet'Neen levels of economic and political development; there has 
also been a growing awareness among these same experts that eco­
nomic development (or the lack of it) is also an important deter-· 
minant a s  to how rapidly and how effectively that political de­
velopment can and will take place and that a lag in either the 
political or economic spheres can and often does affect the de­
velopment of the other. The concept of political-economy, as 
defined by Gutland and Wallerstein, and more specifically con-
cerned with the relationships between the two areas of develop­
ment, will be explored in more detail later, but it will suffice 
at this time to make clear that increasingly it has become ap­
p�rent that political and economic development are two very in­
terrelated and indeed interdependent phenomenon, and historically 
when·one· studies development, whether in the Western or other 
models, one frequently finds that political development within 
states accompanies the increased development of those nations' 
economic capabilities. 
One 0£ the major problems confronting the newly independent 
African states in the 1960s was that once independence became a 
reality to the masses within individual states, the demands put 
forth by those masses more often than.not exceeded the economic 
-o-
capabilities of the governments to deliver in �erms of the pro­
visioning of goods and services. The reasons behind the new 
governments• inabilities to deliver these goods and services 
demanded by the newly politicized masses were often not merely 
economic in nature, but political as well. 
James Scarritt discusses many of the consequences of colon­
ial rule in the subsequent attempts at est�blishing viable pol­
itical systems after independence in African states. He finds 
that innovative norms were weak outside 'of the economic sphere 
due to the emphasis with the colonial bureaucracy on the "spirit 
I . 
of the clerk" which had a low tolerance for conflict and virtually 
no potential for innovation. Also the colonial system displayed 
a low level of effort at the promoting of political integration 
within the colonized regions, even though these regions were us­
ually very pluralistic in nature; a pluralism which was a dire�t 
effect of the dividing up of the African continent into European 
spheres of influence during the Berlin Conference ( 1884-1885)._ 
Under European colonialism, in fact, there was not only a definite 
separating of the colonizers and the indigenous peoples, but also 
a d�liberate fostering of regional, ethnic, political, and ed­
ucation-based cleavages which were to have very serious ramifi­
cations in the immediate post-independence politics of Nigeria 
as well as various other African nations. 
Scarritt also cites the imposition of various cultures which 
were superimposed upon the cultures of the indigenous peoples 
including the private enterprise culture of European entrepreneurs, 
the Christian culture of the missionaries, and the official, or 
at least semi-official, culture of the colonial administration as 
another effect of the colonizers which would in turn also influence 
the politics of the post-independent states, as various elites 
were recruited within each of these cultures, and as traditional 
cultures attempted to resist the penetrations of these European 
ones. The high concentration of power within the colonial system 
also is listed by Scarritt as an important characteristic of 
colonial rule and he found that even under the indirect form of 
colonial administration as p�acticed by Great Britain, it was 
only purely local decisions which were not made directly by col­
onial authorities, and power as exercised by the administrators 
.. 
was done so in a very authoritarian manner by the colonial bur­
eaucrats with the result that traditional African political sys­
tems were_ frequently modified in an authoritarian direction by 
incorporating them into the colonial system through the cooptive 
processes available. (Scarritt, 1972, p. 24-26). 
Because of the fact that indigenous elites were virtually 
excluded from the major decision-making processes during the 
period of colonial rule, when independence· was attained in the 
. 
1960s, the majority of African governments found themselves in-
_ experienced with the day-to-day problems of administering a na­
tion, as welt as lacking the training and experience necessary 
for planning comprehensive developmental programs. Historically, 
concentrations of control and the differentiation of political 
institutions has preceded the participation of the masses in 
politics, and if one observes the political development within 
-�-
the Western nations of the world as well as Japan it becomes 
apparent that steps to include more and more participants in the 
political processes were taken in tandem with increases in the 
economic capabilities of each particular system to deliver the 
increased demands which naturally accompany increased levels of 
participation in a political system (again, reinforcing the 
thesis put forth by Lipset). However, in the post-colonial 
states, mass participation was frequently granted by the newly 
formed governments immediately in the post-independence period 
and a great challenge was th�s presented to those elites con­
cerned with economic modernization and development as some of 
the demands by the newly politicized masses soon outpaced both 
the economic as well as political capabilities of the new re­
gimes in power. 
3. Judging the Performance of a Political Regimes 
The fragmentation of the internal politics of many of the 
newly independent states in Africa due to their colonial legacy 
led to stagnation in political and economic development and often 
threatened to bring about the total collapse of individual nation­
state systems. Christian Potholm dis�usses the various capabil­
ities of a political system, capabilities which each particular 
syste� must be·ab'l� to realize if it is to remain a viable and 
legitimate representative of the populace and if it is to remain 
in a position of political power, including the following• 
(1) Regulative capacity--the ability of a government 
to control the actions of its peoples and to in-
-9-
fluence members' behavior with the amount of regu­
lation necessary to regulate each society varying; 
(2) Extractive capability--the ability to· tap a nation's 
human and natural resources in terms of productivity 
collection, and utilization of these resources; 
(J) Distributive capability--the ability to reward a 
nation's member populace by the allocation of goods, 
services, and status; 
(4) Rejuven�tive capability--the ability of a system 
to reinforce itself, maintain and alter its insti­
tutions, structures, and processes, and to replenish 
its personnel through the socialization and recruit­
ment processes; 
(5) Symbolic capability--the images (domestically and 
internationally) that the particular governmental 
regime projects (which is in essence, a reflection 
not only of the regulative, extractive, distribu­
tive, and rejuvenative capabilities and their par­
ticular interactions, but also of the decision 
making process and its goal orientations as well as 
the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of 
the world community). (Potholm, 1970, p. 11-26). 
The legitimacy, and hence very survival of any particular 
political system (survival over an extended period of time), de­
pends upon the regime in power and its ability to tap the poten­
tials of the particular nation in-terms of human and natural re-
-10-
sources which in turn means that a government's utilization of each 
of the capabilities described by Potholm. This is one set of 
criteria which will be used in an examination of the performance 
of the military regime in Nigeria during the 1970s, particularly 
as those criteria relate to efforts at economic development. 
4. The Emergence of Military Regimes as Agents of Developmenta 
In the post-colonial era we witnessed time and time again 
the failure of governments to fully realize their individual na­
tion's potentials and capabilities.in the area of regulative, 
extractivet distributive, rejuvenative, and symbolic capacities, 
and as internal problems continued to mount, alternative political 
solutions begain to be explored and indeed undertaken. The most 
common.alternative utilized, not only in Africa, but also in Latin 
America and Asia, was the emergence of the military as a dominant 
force in the internal politics of individual nations. Again it is 
P�tholm who has studied the various reasons often given for the 
necessity of authoritarian forms of governments which have often 
emerged in African political systems and he includes the followinga 
(1) The multiplicity of the peoples found within the 
boundaries of individual nations and the prevalence 
of traditionalism in present relationships and in­
stitutions s 
(2) The artificial boundaries of the nations and their 
particular colonial experi.ences; 
(3) The failures of pluralism both in theory and practice 
in the immediate post-colonial exneriences 0£ African 
nations; 
-11-
(4) The continuing foreign interferences in African 
politics. (Potholm, 1979, P· 197). 
Whether or not one accepts the contentions by various au­
thors that authoritarian forms of government are necessary to 
handle the .specific problems being encountered by newly inde­
pendent nations, the fact remains that the mid-196os witnessed 
the emergence of a plethora of mi�itary-dominated governments 
throughout the African continent. The motives· for the various 
interventions of the military and subsequent establishments of 
military regimes within African political systems has varied and 
includes: 
(1) A concern by the military with the prevalence of 
corruption within the civilian governments a· 
(2) The breakdowns in civilian political systems and a 
concern on the part of the military with the threat 
of a total collapse of the entire system; 
(3) Chauvanistic concerns within military factions re­
garding their allocation of resources by the civil­
ian regimesa 
(4) The· need to prevent disciplinary action which a , 
civilian regime had threatened against the military 
(the particular case of 1971 �ganda); 
(5) Because of military opposition to the prevalent 
civilian politi�al ideologya 
(�·) nue. to the prevailing internal military rivalriesa 
(1).Prevailing ethnic conflicts within. the. military (as 
-12-
was so evident in Nigeria in the early 1960s); 
(8) The pursuit of societ�l changes (Somalia and Ethi­
opia); 
(9) Exogenous intrusions and individual reactions by 
the military to such actions; 
{10) An attempt to arbitrate between conflicting groups 
' 
. within an individual nation; 
{11) Personal power grab� (Dahomey, Uganda, and Togo); 
(12) Coups tend to simulate other coups. (Potholm, 1979, 
p. 198-202). 
5. Past Performances of Military Regimes as Developers: 
The emergence of military governments due to any one of 
the above reasons or any combination of them, has largely been 
due to the fact that traditionally military organizations have 
felt that they are above the internal politics which in many 
instances in the post-independence states were responsible for 
extended periods of political and economic instability. In the 
example of Nigeria in 1965 ethnicity played a major role in the 
assumption of political power by the military as did the real 
�ear'that the allowing of a secessionist movement would· set a 
dangerous precedent, a fear felt by many other African leaders. 
In developing countries it is often the military which represents 
the largest single group of individuals who have received at 
least a primary education (among the enlisted ranks) as well as 
a significant number of highly, often Western-educated individuals 
(the officer ranks) and it is partially because of these factors 
�13-
that many military leaders have felt that their organizations 
are the most capable in terms of abilities to tap the human 
and natural resources, regain stability, and set the nation on 
a successful course of economic development. 
The available data from a twenty year survey of military 
and nonmilitary regimes seems to support the milit.a�¥'S contention 
that in many instances tney are an ·organization which is capable 
of instituting development policies and programs. A study con-
( 
ducted by McKinlay and Cohan found no indication that military 
regimes had a weaker background as concerns economic development 
expertise than nonmilitary regimes. However further information 
seems to indicate that military regimes are in a somewhat weaker 
positiqn as regards international trade than are nonmilitary.low­
inoome regimes and that military regimes do appear to have lower 
levels of exports and imports than do low-income nonmilitary ones 
in various GNP categories. As specifically regards the economic 
performance of military regimes the findings indicate that cost 
of living increases are significantly higher in military regimes, 
rates of growth overall in terms of GNP  and exports are however, 
very similar to nonmilitary regimes. Further, African military 
regimes have weaker background and international trading positions 
and do not perform as well as th.e equivalen� nonmilitary govern­
ments. Of course Nigeria, with its crude petroleum reserve�. 
finds that it has been able to realize significant growth rates 
and at the· present enjoys a favorable position in the world mar-
kets. 
Another qualifying comment concerning the peculiarities of 
the Nigerian military regime of the 1970s which affects some of 
the findings of McKinlay and Cohan is the fact that. the seizure 
of power by the military in 1995 did not reflect any ideological 
deviation on the part of the mil.i tary but was purely a move to 
prevent the collapse of the nation. The military since it has 
been in power has not pu�sued massive nationalization policies 
which have so commonly occurred under other mi�itary regimes, 
although the indigenization policies enacted in 1978 did attempt 
to ensure Nigerian control of the essential means of production. 
The military has also pursued a mixed economy as its goal for 
economic development with only a minimum of the very essential. 
-
industries being state-owned (such as petroleum). The major con-
cern of the military regime in Nigeria since political stability 
was achieved in 1970 has been a very pragmatic approach towards 
economic development with the growth and development of essential 
infrastructures and the providing of capital for investments being 
the major areas of concentration and direct government involvement. 
. -
' 
6. A Framework for an Analysis of Nigerian Economic Developments 
By focusing on the economic development efforts·of the 
Nigerian military regime during· the period from 1970-1979. this 
paper is attempting to evaluate the military as an agent of de­
velopment. Because of the interrelationships and interdependences 
between economic and political development, the efforts of the 
military in the promotion of economic development are closely re­
lated to the continuing process of political development which 
-15-
will culminate in the SGptember return to a civilian form of 
a democratic government. Because of traditions of democratic 
forms of decision making at the communal and tribal level through­
out the history of Nigeria and the early participation of the 
masses in the 1960s, the military has never pretended to be more 
than a temporary custodian of the nation, serving only until 
stability could be regained and a peaceful transiticn to a.civ­
ilian government would be feasible. Fotholm discusses the var-' 
ious models of military governments which emerged during the 
l.960s, including praetorian ones (in which rule was both hier­
archical an� authoritarian but in which the core of authority was 
weakened by acute societal and military factionalism), personal 
dictatorships (in which the rule was highly authoritarian and 
personal such as was witnessed in Uganda under Amin), managerial 
brokerage systems (in which case the military is in power merely 
to arbitrate disputes among sectors of society1 (the military has 
relatiYely high status and firm lines divide the military and 
civilian sectors)s and bureaucratic and holding systems (in · 
which power assumptions are from the onset only temporary in 
nature). (Potholm, 1979, p. 204). 
Using the information provided by Potholm it is evident from 
the Nigerian example that the motives behind the military take­
over of political power in Nigeria was a combination of a desire 
to prevent the collapse of the nation (the secession of Biafra) 
as well as the prevailing ethnic conflicts found both within 
the Nigerian society as well as within the �ilitary. It is also 
-16- . 
evident that the military never pretended to be more than a bur­
eaucratic holding system because of its initial declarations con­
cerning an eventual return to civilian rule. While many political 
scientists have a jaundiced view concerning such pro�ises made by 
various military regimes concerning a return to a civilian govern­
ment once "stability" has been achieved, information collected by 
Henry Bienen seems to indicate that indeed the Nigerian military 
regime has never pretended to be more than a temporary stabilizing 
force within the political system. In Bienen's survey he found 
that the military has created or recrea.ted civilian or mixed 
civilian-military institutions for the purpose of gathering, pro­
cessing, and disseminating information as well as for the purpose 
of major decision making. While the military has failed itself 
to recruit grass-roots support, it has relied on civilian poli­
ticians to establish contacts, especially in the rural areas 
(an indication that the military is not concerned with maintain­
ing any more political support than is necessary for the imple­
mentation of development schemes). Bienen further found that the 
majority of the military presence in political and administra­
tive capacities was at the Supreme Military Council and.the Fed­
eral Executive Council, but not in state cabinets. Military 
officers, aside from Governors, did not play prominent roles 
in state cabinet discussions and since 1967 a definite effort 
has been undertaken to incorporate civilians into federal and 
state executive positions. Civilian commissioners exercise 
c�nsiderable authority within the civil service operations· and the 
-17-
cabinets appeared t o  be highly p oliticized b odies (the speeial­
ization of institutions described by Welch as a step in the 
development of a p olitical system). (Bienen, 1978, p. 210-212). 
In its attempt t o  evaluate the performance of the military 
regime during the 1970s in Nigeria as a promoter of ·econ omic 
devel opment this paper will be concerned with the various data 
' 
which economists frequently refer t o  in order t o  judge economic 
developmental strategies. However, it is important that from 
the onset we realize that while statistics c oncerning growth 
rates in Domestic National Product and per capita income are im­
portant indicators of economic growth, the concern of political 
scientists and economists should be with economic development as 
well as economic growth. Often g�owth rates may be deceptive in 
that while gr owth appears c ontinuous, real development may not 
occur and n o  real distribution of new wealth may be realized. 
While p ost-1949 China realized only marginal real gr owth rates, 
development did occur and for the first time in that nation's 
hist ory its p opulace was fed, cared for, and the real compre­
hensive development of infrastructures started to be initiated. 
Conve·rsely, while in p ost-WWI I  Brazilian economic growth has been 
marvelled at by various economists and p olitical scientists alike, 
no real attempt has been seen to distribute.the increased growth 
in any equitable manner as the beneficiaries of the rapid eco­
nomic growth have been the elites. 
The concern of this paper with development as opposed merely 
to growth alone, means that what will be studied is the amounts 
of capital invested by the government in the creation and main-
-18-
tenance of the various infrastructures which are the essentials 
as conduits of economic and also political development. The pri­
orities of the military regime will be explored in terms of bud­
get allocations and capital investments, and deficiencies in the 
overall planning will be explored, and possible remedies discussed. 
An emphasis on development means that this paper will be 
' 
�oncerned with examining the development as well as the refine-
ment of those physical infrastructures which are so essential if 
a nation's economic development is to be fostered, and more 
specifically include transportation, communication, agricultural, 
educational, and industrial structures upon which the nation can 
build the bases for its pursuit of economic development. Import­
export figures will be examined in order to try and determine 
areas in productivity in which the Nigerian economy is growing, 
declining, or merely stagnating, and ma jor shifts in the emphasis 
of the regime's planning will be explored for possible negative 
or positive impacts on the future economic growth and development 
of the nation. 
When one considers the colonial experiences of the nation of 
Nigeria it is not·s�prising that one finds serious problems still 
facing that nation in the area of economic development. If one 
is to compare the majdr deficiencies found in most of the devel­
oping countries at the times of their independence with George 
Masannat's list of factors which inhibit economic progress it is 
remarkable how many of those factors are present in Nigeria as 
well as. other developing nations. Masannat lists the following 
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factors which impede economic developmenta 
(1) Capital shortages1 
(2) Low per capita incomesa 
(3) Low savings levelsJ 
(4) A lack of technological skillsa 
(5) Poor utilization of human and natural resourcesa 
(6)· Low levels of productivitya 
(7) High birth rates and declining death ratesa 
(8) High illiteracy rates; 
(9) An Agrarian economy1 
(10) Inadequate communication and transportation systems; 
(11) A scarcity of natural resources: 
(12) Limited social mobility; 
(13) Unfavorable political conditions: 
(14) Weak and arbitrary tax systemsa 
(15) Corrupt public administration; 
(16) An absence of a strong middle class; 
(17) A tradition-bound society: 
(18) A lack of land reform; 
· (19) A lack of organized marketing; 
(20) A suspicion of and discrimination against �oreign 
exports and capital. (Masannat, 1973. P• 209). 
While it is evident that Nigeria does not possess all twenty 
of these factors which inhibit economic progress, it is also just 
as evident that Nigeria, like the other former colonies in Africa, 
possesses enough of-these criteria to seriously have impeded 
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development efforts ,  and the particular criteria which apply spe­
cifically to the Nigerian experiences will be fully detailed in 
the body of this presentation. 
11. The Political Economy of Nigeria a 
1. Defining Political Economy a 
As stated in the introduction, the economic development 
of Nigeria, as is the case of any nation, both past and present , 
depends on other dynamics within the Nigerian context , as well 
as within the wider dimensions of the world international system. 
In defining ·the concept of political economy• Gut land and Wal­
lerstein stated that the idea of political economy emphasizes 
the intermeshing of political , economic , and social factors of 
change in one ongoing historical process . They further e laborate 
that the dynamics of such change emerges from the continuing 
interplay of economic forces and related social classes and that 
underdevelopment itself is not a condition of being seve�al cen­
turies behind the transformations experienced in the world oap-
i talist sector , but rather a condition of satellization forced 
upon the ·periphery . The Western European nations from the six­
teenth century on were the core nations in terms of capitalist 
economic development , and in fact it was during their mercan­
tilist stage of economic development · that the first close eco­
nomic ties were established between .these core countries and the 
peripherial ones of Africa , Asia , and the Americas . ( Gutland and 
Wallerstein, 1976, p .  12-17 ).  
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Gutland and Wallerstein further contend that the relation-
ship between African areas and European nations was an asymmetri­
cal one as well as an unequal one and that the changes imposed 
on peripheral nations were due largely to endogenous factors . 
Furthermore , the incorporation of Africa into the world political 
and economic system is seen as occurring in three major phases a 
' 
( 1 )  1750-1900era, which transformed relations from relative auto-
nomy to peripheralization and the expansion of the geographical 
boundaries of the capitalist world economy s ( 2 )  1900-1975 era, 
which rested heavily on the extraction of raw materials and on the 
exploitation of available low-cost labor s (J) 1976-present , is an 
era whic�. _)las. presented Africa with a maj or challenge a depende�t 
development , or revolutionary transformation. ( Gutland and Waller-
stein, 1976 , p .  )2-50 ) .  
2 .  Nigerian Development Prior to British Colonial Rule s 
The constant movements of · invaders from Egypt and the 
Sudan into West Africa developed a fairly reliable network of 
communications through the Sahara and laid down the foundation 
for the trans-Saharan trade between North and West Africa. By 
A.n. ·1 , 000,  Kano , in Northern Nigeria , had developed into a 
strong and prosperous trading center ,  and by the start of the 
fifteenth centruy some of the main cities. in the North--Kano, 
Zaria, Kalsina, and Sokota--had grown into great centers of com­
merce . (Ekundare , 19?3. P• 10-11 ) .  
The first contacts between the region which is now Nigeria 
. . 
and Europeans can be traced to the onset of . the flourishing s lave 
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trade when the French constructed a fort at Elmina in 1383. How­
ever, due to internal problems in France at that time in its his­
tory, the fort ha4 to be abandoned ,  and it was not until the fif­
teenth century that we can read well-documented accounts of visits 
by Europeans to the West African coas t .  
The Portuguese brought the first slaves and gold dust se-
' 
cured from West Africa to Lisbon in 1441 and also reconstructed 
another fort at Elmina in 1482. In 1485, Benin City was visited 
by Portuguese who discovered easy access through a navigable river 
as well as an organized kingdom and a powerful monarch. Subse­
quently missionaries sought to establish friendly relations with 
the King of Benin and from 1481 until 1495 King John II of Por­
tugal e stablished a personal correspondence with the monarch of 
Benin. Other nations soon began expressing an interest in West 
African trade and by 1553 British ships had reached the Benin 
River and the extended relationship between Great Britain and 
Nigeria was initiated . (Burns , 1955,  p.  61-73 ) .  
In 1588, a British Captain Welsh established trade ( ele­
phant· teeth , pepper ,  palm oil ) with Nigeria and later returned in 
' 
1591 to set up further commercial relations with that West African 
region. The discovery of North America and the establishment of 
Spanish colonies in the West Indies had created an increased de-
mand for slaves and in the sixteenth century , with the opening up 
of West African trade , there was a virtual rush by Europeans to 
obtain slaves from that region of Africa. Sir John Hawkins was 
the first British captain to engage in the s lave trade·when he 
transported three-hundred slaves ·from Sierra Le one to Haiti .  After 
he successfully accomplished that task,  he was given, as a reward , 
command of a squadron of seven ships , the flagship .which was 
named Jesus , to carry on the African slave trade in the name ·of 
the British Empire . 
1618 marked the year in which King James I of England first 
granted a Charter to a London-based company which was engaged in 
the s lave trade and that company went on to construct Fort James 
on the Gambia River . In 1712 , the Treaty of Utrecht enabled the 
British to secure a thirty year monopoly on the s lave trade to 
the Spanish colonies. and British influence in West Africa con­
tinued to grow . ( Burns , 1955 , p.. 111-239 ) .  
Thus far the contacts between the indigenous peoples of 
West Africa and the Europeans was limited to the minimal amount 
necessary to establish �rade relations between the various trading 
companies and the coastal native elites who secured the Africans 
from the interior to be sold in the New World. Penetrations of 
the interiors for other than exploratory purposes did not take 
place until the actual colonization of the regions of West Africa 
by t}1e Europeans :J_ater in the se.cond half of the nineteenth cen-
, 
tury. 
However ,  economic development was occilrring within the Ni­
gerian region prior to colonialization; and although both France 
and Great Britain tried to create the illusion that the African 
continent had no social or political history piror to contacts 
with the Europeans , much less any economic history, evidenc�s of 
development in all three areas are well-documented in historical 
accounts of the Nigerian region by various European as well as 
African historians , political scientists , and economist s .  
Trading, administration , and manufacturing were widespread 
in Nigerian areas as fa! back as 1732 and by the mid-1800s sec-
' 
ondary and tertiary activities had become diversified . For ex-
ample , weavers ,  tanners , ' iron smelters , blacksmiths , sawyers , 
carpenters , and potters ( for various oils ) were all present in 
Ibadan in 1851. The urban economy of that region, was at that 
point in time , dependent on slave labor in the agricultural sec­
tor to provide the nec�ssary food supplies to the urban centers . 
(Smith , 1976 , p.  429-430 ) .  
3� Increased British Penetrations and Colonial Rulea 
The latter half of the nineteenth century was disrupted 
by colonialization efforts by the British with the resulting pol­
itical and institutional, as well as economic changes which were 
imposed on the indigenous peoples .  Colonialization and its - far­
reaching effects on native populations throughout the African con­
tinent as well as within other peripheral regions of the capitalist 
wor�d economic system was the major phenomenon in the modern 
history of human relations which created the conditions leading 
to the definition of " political economy" as a means of explain-
ing degrees of underdevelopment found today throughout the de­
veloping world. 
The first direct interference in Nigerian political . affairs 
came in · i851 with the British military ac·tions against LagQs 
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in· an effort to force its monarch to abandon the s lave trade 
(England by this time had become more " enlightened" concerning 
the inherent evils of dealing with human live s ). The Royal Niger 
Company was formed in 1886 and its Charter gave it control over 
all of Nigeria , including the Northern region. Also, in 1886 , the 
British government proclaimed the Oil Rivers Protectorate over 
the Niger Delta and established the colony of Lagos . 
In 1893 the Niger Coast Protectorate was e stablished and 
this marked the point when a well-organized governmental machinery 
was established for the administration of colonial affairs. In 
1897 , the entire Yoruba land was annexed into Lago s ,  and in 1900. 
the British took over the administration of Northern Nigeria and 
prociaimed that area to be the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. 
Finally, in 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were 
amalgamated to officially form the nation of Nigeria. ( Ekundare . 
19?3 , P· 12 ) .  · 
' 
Thus by the turn of this c�ntury B�itish penetrations , and 
eventual political control over ,  the region that was to be Ni-
geria, were complete .  At the same time . British penetrations 
-
wers altering the. political st�uctutes of the indigenous peoples , 
so were these penetrations also affecting the economic structures 
of the native peoples .  It is these changes in the indigenous 
economic structures which concern the orientation of this paper 
as concerns the concept of political economy as an explanation 
of the lack of economic development in colonial Nigeria. 
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As the nineteenth century proceeded and the s lave trade 
died out due to the pressures from the British metropole , ef­
fects were felt by indigenous economies which had become depen­
dent on the trade ( the Ashanti in particular) as well as Euro­
peans who likewise had developed a dependency on the s lave trade 
(the Portuguese ) .  Economic substitutes soon grew up in Western 
Africa including timber 'in Sierra Leone , palm oil in the Niger 
Delta and Dahomey, groundnut oil in Gambia and Senegal. However 
at the same time that agricultural production was expanding in 
response to colonial administrative efforts , economic activities 
in Western Africa were deteriorating as blacksmithing and smelt­
ing activities declined and iron ore mining and textile production 
similarly experiended a downward trend (as had indigenous economic 
activities in India during the early years of British colonial­
ization) .  Competition from European manufacturers reduced indig­
enous economic activities to the production of raw materials , 
caused an urban to rural population shift , and created a colonial 
market for European-manufactured finished good s .  (Wallerstein, 
1976 , P• J0-39 ) .  
, The period from 1900-1929 is often referred to ·as ·the per- · · 
iod of rapid export expansion within Nigeria. Great strides were 
. taken in the development of an export economy ·and export volumes 
increased from only two percent of total GDP to a five to seven 
percent figure . (Helleiner , 1966 , p. l-2J ) .  Important new cash 
crops were groundnuts , cocoa, rubber, and cotton, resulting in 
more and more peasants coming into contact with the world market s .  
- .i;. , -
However, the overall structure of the economy and technological 
levels change·d very little as the great bulk of economic activity 
consisted of trading activities undertaken for domestic use ra­
ther than sales to world market s .  By 1929 , domestic trade ac­
tivities accounted for 85 percent of the value of the GDP and this 
trade base remained the dominant characteristic of the economy 
(which was to establish a precedent for an internal orientation 
, 
by indigenous entrepreneurs as we ll as a concentration of those 
entrepreneurs in trading as opposed to productive commercial 
enterprise s ,  which has had serious effects on efforts at economic 
development of an industrial infrastructure since independence ) .  
Economic growth of the Nigerian nation was interrrupted from 
1929 until 1945 , initially by the world depression, and then by 
the Second World War. The depression and the resulting world­
wide collapse in commodity prices brought severe reductions in 
Nigeria' s  export prices and stagnation in export volumes .  The 
value. of cotton fell by 58 percent and rubber by 78 percent , in 
terms of unit values ,  and by 90 percent and 88 percent , respec­
tively ,· in terms of their export values .  By the end of \tWI I ,  
prices for commodities were still at only fifty perce.nt . of their 
value , but import prices had risen sharply during the war years 
due to shipping sh�rtages and the �carcity of consumer good s .  Im­
ports total costs rose by 100 percent during the 1939-1945 period 
alone . (Helleiner , 1966 , p. 27-32 ) .  
One structural change in Nigeria which was undertaken to 
cope with the wartime marketing conditions was the creation of 
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statutory marketing boards which extended state control (mean­
ing at this time colonial ) over marketing and the appropriation 
of surplus value from the peasantry. These boards proved effective 
in subsidizing the costs of primary products for the British con­
sumer and also withholding a share of the price from the farmers . 
Since independence ,  the marketing boards have been used to fund 
\ 
regional and state governmental activities , party campaigns , and 
the consumption and accumulation of money by the rich and powerful 
but they have never been used to protect the farmers who bear the ' 
brunt of market fluctuations . (Williams , 1976 , Gutland and Waller­
stein , ed . , p. 141-152 ) .  
After WWII rapid economic progress started t o  take place · 
and real growth of GDP was 4 . 1 percent annually from 1950-1958 
and 4 . 5  percent from 1959-196).  The 1950s also witnessed the 
beginnings of industrial development and an increasing partici­
pation t:r the government in all sectors of the economy. Exports 
of goods and services increased 117 percent during the 1950-
1960 period , but at the same time imports rose by 246 percent , 
offsetting any real gains in Nigerian trade relationships . A 
pattern was also being set for the . reliance on imported consumer, 
and in some instances,  basic , commodities . The e conomy remained 
overwhelmingly agricultural during the 1950s , a trend which was 
to have serious consequences when agricultural production started 
to decline in the 1960s . Also during the 1950s government ex­
penditures excee4ed those projected as being needed by the World 
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Bank , indicating spending irregularities as well as the stagnation 
of prices for commodities which led to budget deficits starting 
in 1955· ( Berry and Liedholm, 1970, P •  67-69 ) .  
During the 1950-1962 period , agricultural exports increased 
due to initial world price increases , and research programs were 
expanded and also large-scale agricultural enterprises were started 
to be promoted,  although government-owned plantati�ns contributed 
little to agricultural production output . The industrial sector 
of the economy, though small,  grew rapidly from 1950-1962 , although 
mining was virtually stagnant until 1960 ( oi l  was first seriously 
drilled in 195e ) .  However, industrial development reflected the 
regional variations which have been a part of the ethnic history 
of the Nigerian state , as the majority of manufacturing was cen­
tered around Lagos and during 1954-1957 , the most rapid economic 
growth occurred in the Eastern and Northern regions . The govern­
ment attempted to promote industrialization and growth through 
the use of tax incentives ,  but �he transfer of authority to re­
gions tended to promote interregional rivalries in economic sec­
tors . ( Berry and Liedholdm, 19?0,  p .  24-2 5 ) . 
· In regards to the establishment of infrastructures ,  20 per­
cent of all government expenditures were devoted to transportation 
arid communication with resulting substantial increases in road 
mileage and railroad tracks as well as bridges and telephone and 
telegraph facilities . Within the area of education, the original 
goal of free universal primary education soon faced financial and 
staffing problems , as well as discrepancies between regions . 
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While the Eastern and Western regions devoted between 37-49 per­
cent of their budgets to education, the Northern region never al­
located more than 2 5  percent . In the short run , education made 
little contribution to economic development due to a shortage of 
teachers and their low level of quality and very little was done 
to promote and increase secondary and higher educational facili­
ties . (Berry and Liedhol'm , 1970,  p. 77-80 ) .  
One pattern which was apparent at the close of the 1950s , 
and one which still effects the economic· progres s  of the nation 
today, was the high level of domestic consumpti on in relation to 
increases in GDP output . While the GDP was increasing at a fairly 
constant four percent annual rate during the 1950s , consumption 
was relative constant at 90 percent of GDP and government consump­
tion increased from J . 4  to 7 . 5  percent while gross domestic sav­
ings was relatively constant at ten percent of GDP.  (Hansen, 
1976 , Gutland and · Wallerstein , ed. , p .  194 ) • 
. With independence in 1960,  the Nigerian economy was in a 
position which made it difficult to predict the future of the 
nation in terms of economic development . Though rapid economic 
·progress had occurred during the period from 1900-1960,  serious 
problems remained and important patterns were emerging. The dom­
ination of primary production in terms of exports meant an economy 
based on commodities which were often at the mercy of those com­
modity boards in Europe and North America. A large percentage of 
the in�igenous population w�o were engaged in other than agri­
cultural-related· production were concentrated in trading activities 
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not in productive commercial enterprises.  The government was 
increasingly dominating economic planning and as a result was as­
suming a large position in terms of its proportion ·of consumption 
of the GDP. Also regional inequalities in terms of economic 
development , and what exactly should be the nation' s  priorities 
remained as impediments to the overall development of a Nigerian 
economic system. 
I I I .  Economic Development in Nigeria Since Independence s 
1. The First Economic Development Plan, 1962-1968 :  
The deve lopment of the industrial sector in the Nigerian 
economy which had occurred since WWII was development based on 
import substitution as well as foreign ownership. In 196 3 ,  68 
percent of the shares of 321 concerns .were foreign-owned , with 
64 percent of the total foreign investment being British. (Eicher 
and Liedholm, 197 0 ,  p .  6�12 ) .  This domination of the industrial 
economic sector by foreign interests vividly reflected the fact 
that while 1960 may have marked the political independence of 
the Nigerian nation, economically, the region remained a product 
of neo-colonialism. 
The characteristics of the immedi�te post-independence eco­
nomy of Nigeria is characterized by Lyle Hansen as the following s 
( 1 )  A GDP derived predominantly from primary production 
(but at a rate increasing faster than the population ) .  
( 2 )  A GDP increasing at a 4 percent annual rate s 
' ( 3 )  Gross fixed investment increasing as a share of 
GDP from 7 percent ( 1950 ) to 15 percent ( 1960 )  with 
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declining productivity cited as the reason; 
( 4 )  Consumption relatively constant at 90 percent of 
GDP while the government ' s  share of consumption 
was increasing rapidly from 3 . 4  to 7 . 5  percent i 
( 5 )  Gross domestic savings relative constant at 10 
percent of GDP. {Hanse n .  1976 . Gutland and Waller­
stein ed • •  'p.  194 ) .  
The specific orientations of the first Nigerian economic 
development plan which was to encompass the 1962-1968 era were 
the following: 
( 1 )  The formulation of government capital budgets in as 
integrated a manner as possible r 
( 2 )  The careful development of the implications of a11 · 
governmental capital expenditures and policies in 
the regular budge t s  
( 3 )  The development o f  overall economic policies spe­
cifically towards the private sector and foreign 
capital investments i  
( 4 )  The building of institutions that could be ·used 
increasingly to execute policy and to increase the 
flexibility of the economy. ( Stolper,  1976 . Gutland 
and Wallerstein ed. , p .  222-223 ) .  
These listed orientations of the early economic planning in 
post-independence Nigeria reflected the fact that due to the rel­
ative absence of Nigerian economic planners at independence , the 
economic planning was put in the hands of two Ford Foundation 
economists , who quite expectedly, reflected their Western training 
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and biases as concerned strategies for economic development . 
Howeve r ,  in the initial efforts at the promotion of economic 
development within Nigeria, planners soon found that certain ques­
tions arose even in areas where it seemed that government-provided 
/ 
> . services were necessary, and in fac t ,  essential. Problems of 
time sequences and of staffing were some of the more obvious 
' 
problems initially faced by the government as well as the problem 
of what kinds of services could be provided at· any particular 
point in time or even in the immed�ate future . Problems of the 
capital costs of maintaining .programs once initiated , as well 
as the very real question as to who should pay for the specific 
services , also arose as well as the initial questions concerning 
the providing of the initial capital to get these programs and 
services initiated . ( Stolper , 1976 , Gutland and Wallerstein ed. , 
P• 224-227 ) .  
Problems also arose during the early 1960s concerning the 
allocative decisions which must be made by a government and the 
budgeting process necessary to finance individual projects as 
well as the economic development of the nation as a whole . A 
lack of coordination between pro ject studies and budgeting had 
been a problem with the governmental as well as private sector 
. planne.rs in the past and also the ·11mi ted capabilities (at that 
time ) of applying cost-benefit analyse s  to pro jected programs and 
policies hampered the government ' s  effectivenes s  at promoting 
economic planning and development . (Wells , 1976 , Gutlan� and Wal­
lerstein ed. , p .  250 ) .  
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In..reviewing the budgets during the 1962-1968 development 
program , one finds that only 1) . 6  percent of all governmental ex­
penditures were devoted to primary production and this lack of 
concern with agricultural development seems to have reflected the 
uti�ization of the Western-oriented economists who place almost 
all of their emphasis on rapid industrial development of the 
economy. It was during the first years of independence that it 
� 
first became evident that agricultural production was in fact 
deelining as a proportion of GDP ,  a decline which reflected past 
policies ( such as the establishment of the marketing boards ) as 
well as an orientation by the new leadership towards industrial 
growth, almost exclusively. 
· Problems encountered in attempts in the early 1960s at pro­
mulgating a comprehensive program for Nigerian economic develop­
ment were in part a result of the intellectual traditions in Ni­
gerian planning. From 1946 , when Nigerians were first given any 
real responsibility for their own economi� development unti l  the 
present , the basic planning traditions have been rooted in Western 
capitalist economic s .  The intellectual philosophy has essentially 
been .cap�talist empiricism marked by its pragmatism and .piece­
mean approach to socio-economic problems , and as a result , com­
prehensive planning was substituted with planning of a mixed ' 
economy. The re liance on bourgeoise economics ha� meant · a re­
liance on the dynami�s of the Keynesian economic variat of neo­
classical economic planning with its concern with GDP growth, 
capital-output ratio , and the creation of demand . ( Onimode , 1977 
P· 297 ) .  
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Inherent in this acceptance of neo-classical economic think­
ing has been the primary belief that increases in GDP will solve 
the problems of underdevelopment , and planning is purely con­
ceived of as a technical process of aggregating pro jects and 
programs with the subsequent implementation of these projects and 
programs seen merely as the spending of allocated funds for the 
' 
�pecific purposes envisioned . The fact that the economy of post-
independence Nigeria remained a neo-coloni�l one due to the amounts 
. ) of foreign investments,  also meant that some problems which needed 
to be considered often · were ignored . 
Conc�ptual limits as regards the causes  of underdevelopment 
were very evident in the ea�ly planning of an independent Nigerian 
economy and these included the fact that structural economic 
changes were necessary, not just a raising of GDP growth rates ; 
changes which must include some nationalization of the economy and 
an elevation of heavy industrialization to the forefront of the 
economic plans while not ignoring the real needs and problems being 
encountered in agricultural production. Methodological problems 
also were encountered in that while spending by the government was 
emphasized (again Keynesian economics ) ,  construction of infra-
structures were ignored to a very large extent , infrastructures 
which due to -the colonial experiences and constraints within 
Niger.la had not developed as part of a natural and more normal 
aspect of economic development . A " textile first" approach was 
used by early Nigerian and Western planners in terms of invest­
ment allocations , with the result that core heavy industries were 
were re latively ignored .  Also planning was not concrete in that 
targets for various sectors and projects were not established 
in concrete material terms ( a  problem which economic planners were 
to run into in the 1970s , as goals and aims of development were , 
and still are , often presented in broad , ambiguous terms geared 
at creating favorable political and societal acceptance ) .  Another 
' 
failure in early economic planning was the lack of a. multi9.is-
ciplinary approach to resolving economic problems and priorities / 
. J 
as all planning tended to be dominated by economlsts . °( Onimode , 
�97 7 ,  p .  301-303 ) .  Problems - encountered in planning were further 
magnified by the fact that political power remained in the regions 
and in terms of manpower the regions were in a much better posi­
tion than was the federal government. The federal government , 
in fact , often lacked trained economists , and as already stated , 
was forced to rely on economists supplied from the West , economists 
- trained in traditional economic planning. Effective planning was 
furthe� thwarted by the absence of reliable statistics upon which 
to pro ject expected growth rates . ( Aboyad e ,  1966 , p.  154-168 ) .  
2 .  The Civil War and Instability, 1965-1970 1  
Although it is more than apparent . that rea1 · p�6blems were 
being encountered in the implementation of the first economic 
development plan for the years 1962-1968 , the real success or 
failure of the first real attempt at Nigerian economic develop­
ment is impossible to evaluate due to the outbreak of the Civil 
War in 1965.  ·· while the disadvantages of colonialization have 
been briefly dealt with already as regards economic and political 
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development , the effects it had within the Nigerian nation in the 
political arena became all too apparent in the first few years of 
independence . The strengthening of ethnic divisions th�ough the 
British colonial policy of indirect rule which maintained re­
gional and ethnic divisions , and the lack of efforts at the pro- . 
motion of a strong �entral government for other than administrative 
purpose s ,  meant that in the .Post-independence period , a jockeying 
and maneuvering of positions was constantly taking place between 
the many ethnic groups of the regions , the Hausa-Fulanis ,  Ibos , 
� 
and Yorubas . Also the fact that the British .colonial poli� 
was based on the most economical means possible meant that ed­
ucation for the indigenous peoples had been all but ignored and 
this ip turn retarded the development of a local modern elite to 
take over the management of political and economic institutions 
after independence . ( S chmitt , 19?4, p .  120-135 ) .  
The real importance in education as a basis for political 
development is · a1so discussed by Lipset and from his surveys he 
re�ches the conclusions that a nation' s level of education is 
strongly correlated to that nation' s populace ' s  receptiveness 
towards democracy� Correspondingly·, Lipset contends that the 
rise in educational levels , which is a direct result of economic 
development efforts ,. corresponds to the ris� of a middle class , · 
another prerequisite ·for political development . { Lipse t ,  1962 , 
P• 38 ) .  
The political maneuverings which were occurring throughout 
the early 1960s finally resulted in the attempt by the Ibos at 
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a Biafran secession ,  with the ensuing years of internal war , as 
the federal government attempted to isolate the movement and 
prevent a precedent from being established for the fragmentation 
of the Nigerian stat e .  As already discussed , one of the reasons . 
cited by Potholm for the intervention of the military in govern­
ments in African nations was the breakdown in civilian governments 
' 
and a concern by the military to prevent the total collapse of the 
political - system. Also Potholm listed ethnic conflicts within 
\ . 
the military and the need of a group ·. to arbitrate conflicts be-
tween soeietal groups as reasons for the intrusion of the mil­
itary in government , reasons well evident in the early years of 
Nigerian independence. 
Whatever the results of this extended period of instability 
has had and will continue to have on the political development of 
Nigeria , there can be no doubt that for five years the economic 
development of the nation was at a virtual standstill. It was 
only because petroleum was increasingly becoming more imrortant 
to the export earnings and its partial disruptions in production 
during the war years were being temporarily filled by increases in 
agricultural production, that the federal government was · even 
able to finance the eventually successful campaign to halt the 
secessionist movement . However, the rest of. the plans for the 
development of the economy had to take a back seat as the pri� 
mary concern of the federal government was the maintenance of 
the Nigerian state , through the complete domina'tion of the se­
cessionist movement . Again it is Potholm who lists the major 
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goals of any political system and at the top of the list he 
places the very survival of the systems 
( 1 )  Survival--the most universally articulated and pur­
sued goal of any political system is the endurance 
of the system as ari entity; 
( 2 )  Freedom--another goal is freedom from the controls 
' 
of others , a concept which in an interdependent 
world is becoming more and more �elative 1 
( 3 )  Stability--refers to the attempt to preserve the 
existi.ng political structure and its societal and 
economic underpinnings : 
( 4 )  Political development i 
( 5 )  Economic development ; 
( 6 )  Welfare--the physical and psychological well-being 
of a nation' s populace s 
( ? )  Democratic and/or Command decision making--refers 
to the attempt to compromise the methods in which 
key decisions are made between including the masses 
while at the same time maintaining some degree of 
elite control ;  
( 8 )  International objectives--which may include the 
pursuit of prestige , influence ,  and conquest . ( Pot­
holm, 1970, p .  29 ) .  
IV. Economic Development in the 1970s a 
. . 1. The Second Development Plan, 1970-1974 1 
On the basis of statistics alone , the four years follow� 
ing the conclusion of the Civil War and a resumption of more or 
less normal , . stable internal economic relations , were years of 
successful growth in purely economic terms . In the years from 
" 
1970-1974 the GDP doubled from the 1960 figure with high growth 
rates of 8 . 5 percent i� 1972-1973 and 12 . 5  percent in 19?4- Man­
ufacturing do_ubled its s'hare of the economy from 5-10 percent 
by 1973 and in terms of raw economic figures grew from a mere 
38 million naira · (the naira is worth approximately . 65 in u . s .  
currency ) in 1960 to 6 . 0  billion naira in 1974. The nation' s 
balance of payments were in the black in 1974, after experiencing 
a 38 million naira deficit in 1973· ( Gambari , 197 5 ,  p.  158 ) .  
However, once again in the Nigerian example of 1970-1974, 
we have observed a common phenomenon in economic growth theories ,  
the example where economic growth has not been accompanied by 
economic development . It is true that based on statistics alone 
it appeared that the Nigerian economy ·was grwoing rapidly during 
the period under observation, howeve�. when one examines the 
particular four years a little more closely, one becomes aware 
of the �eal story behind the so-called early developme�tal trends 
within the Nigerian economy. 
While there c�n be no doubt that the growth rates indicated 
already were indeed being achieve d ,  the rates at which economic 
growth appeared to be heading were i�dicative of only one major 
primary product , crude petroleum , and the fact that in tt:ie· 1973-
1974 period the world prices for OPEC petroleum qu�druple� . The· 
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increasing importance of petroleum and its by-products within the 
Nigerian economy is illustrated by studying the rapid increases 
in the percentages of government revenues generated from that 
particular sector of the economy a 
Table !--Government Revenue Sources, 1970-1975i 
Year Total (million naira ) Petroleum Revenue � of Total 
1970 633 . 2  166 . 4  26 . 3  
1971 1169 . 0  1510 . 2 4) . 6  
1972 1404 . 8  2764 . 3  54. 4 
1973 1695 . 3  1016 . 0  59 . 9  
1974 4537 . 0  3726 . 7  82 . 1  
1975 5514 . 7  4272. 5 77 . 5  
( Panter-Brick , 1978, P• 152 ) .  
While petroleum was growing fivefold in volume of produc­
tion, its price value , due to the unique set of political cir­
cumstances which were prevalent in 1973-1974, was increasing 
thirtyfold . The importance of petroleum in terms of export earn­
ings is similarly reflected in the following data concerning 
the export structure of Nigeria in 1973, before the quadrupling 
of tne prices of oi� ( in thousands of u . s .  dollars ) a · 
Table I I--Nigerian Export Structure, 197J a  
( 1 )  All Commodities 3 . '344 , 697 
( 2 )  crude Petroleum 2 , 775, 700 
( J )  Cocoa 202 , 000 
( 4 )  Oil Seeds , .  Nuts ,  Kernels 112 , 599 
( 5 )  Fixed Vegetable Oils ( soft ) 36, 564 
( 6 )  Animal Food 
( ? )  Special Transactions 
( 8 )  Rubber ( synthetic ) 
( 9 )  Tin 
tlO ) Hides 
( 11 )  Wood 
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( 1 2 )  Fixed Vegetable Oil ( nonsoft ) 
( 1 3 )  Petroleum products 
( 14 )  Leather 
( 1 5 )  Cotton 
( 16 )  Remainder 
35.499 
31, 357 
29 .482 
2 3 , 492 
18 , 983 
14, 503 
11, 836 
l 0 , 930 
1 0 , 444 
1 . 176 
24, 132 
(Handbook of International Trade Statistics , 1977. p.  149 ) .  
Another problems which was looming in the near future was 
the relative decline of agriculture as an important earner _ of 
export income . While petroleum production was increasing fivefold , 
in terms of volume during the years of the second development 
plan, agriculture contributed nuthing towards the economic de­
velopment of Nigeria. In fact , there has been a 40 percent de­
cline in the volume of agricultural production between 1964-1966 
- . 
peri'od and 1972-1974. ( Handbook. of International Trade Statistics , 
1977.  p.  198 ) .  The rapid growth in agricultural production ex­
perienced during the Civil War was _ a misleading projector of 
future trends and as previously mentioned ,  more accurately re­
flected a temporary decline in petroleum production with agri­
culture filling the gap only during the war years . 
' 
The precarious pasition of the Nigerian economy during the 
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second economic development plan is further illustrated when one 
observes the fact that aside from crude petroleum, the rest of 
the export. earners during the 1973 period were primary products ,  
products which depend on increased agricultural production, at a 
time when agricultural production in Nigeria was · in . fact ·declining 
As all of those who are concerned with economic development re-
' 
alize , a nation that depends on the fluctuations of the world 
commodity markets to finance further economic development , par­
ticularly whan that nation' s agricultural production is declin­
ing, is a nation failing to comprehend the true interactions in 
the world ' s  economic order as it is determined by the Western 
industrialized states which establish the ground-rules for in­
ternational trade.  
During the same period that Nigeria was experiencing a rapid 
economic growth rate due to the increases in Petroleum production 
and increases in the value of petroleum products ,  it remained de­
pendent on the industrial nations of the West for manufactured 
goods , and even some of the basic essentials. such as cement and 
steell and iron products , which are of vital importance in any 
effort to · promote industrial development and the establishment of 
basic industrial infrastructures . The following figure� reflect 
the faqt that due to the nature of its economic development during 
the colonial period , a time when a major emphasis was placed on 
primary production, the Nigerian economy in the early 1970s , re­
mained saddeled with a trade deficit as it attempted to indus­
�rialize its econo�y a 
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Table III--Nigerian Imports (millions of u . s .  dollars ) s  
( 1 )  1970 1, 308 
( 2 )  1973 2 , 736 
( 3 )  1974 4 , 332 
( 4 )  1975 .8,  179 . 
( .5 )  Percent of Change--22 0 . 6  �Handbook of International 
' 
Trade and Development Statistics , 197 7 .  p. 198 ) .  
Table IV--Nigerian Exports (millions of U� S .  dollars ) s  
( 1 ) - .1970 
( 2 )  1973 
( 3 )  1974 
( 4 )  1975 
. 1 01 . 8  
136 . 6  
228 . 6  
1108 . 2  (Handbook of International Trade 
and Develonment Statistics , 197 7 .  p.  198 ) .  
Another measure of the failure of economic development as 
. opposed to economic growth in Nigeria in the early 1970s is the 
total values of the various sectors of the economy in terms of the 
total export structure as is shown belowa 
Table V--Nigerian Export Structure/Percentage Share · of Total a 
( 1 )  Total Value (mlllions of u� s .  dollars ) a  
a .  1970 1 , 149 . 1 
b .  1973 3 , 345 . 4  
c .  1974 9 , 354. 7 
d .  1975 7 , 829;7  
( 2 )  Food ItemsLPercentage of Total a 
-45-. 
a .  1970 33. 5 
b. 1973 12 . 12 
c .  1974 4 . 97 
d .  1975 5 . 2 7  
( J )  Agricultural Raw Materials/Percentage of Total a 
a .  1970 5 . 46 
' 
b.  1973 2 . 29 
c .  1974 0 . 99 
d .  1975 0 . 6 0  
( 4 )  Fuels/Percentage of Total s 
a.  1970 55. 28 
b .  1973 83. 30 
c .  1974 93. 60 
d .  1975 93 . 21 
( 5 )  Ores and Metals/Percentage of Tota l •  
a .  1970 4. 49 
b .  1973 0 . 80 
c .  1974 0 . 52 
d .  1975 0 . 47 
· ( 6 )  · Manufactured ·Goods/Percentage of Tota l a  
a .  1970 0 . 77 
b. 1973. 0 . 52 
C •  1974 0 . 19 
' d .  1975 0 . 17 
( 7 )  Chemical Products/Percentage of Tota l s  
a.  1970 0 . 03 
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b .  1973 0 . 04 
c .  1974 0 . 03 
d .  1915 0 . 03 
( 8 )  Other Manufactured Goods/Percentage of Total a 
a .  1970 0 . 74 
b .  1973 0 . 48 
1974 ' c .  0 . 17 
d .  1975 0 . 15 (Handbook of International Trade 
and Develo12ment Statistics , 1977 ,  P •  113 ) . . 
As the above figures indicate , while petroleum and its by­
p�oducts were steadily increasing as the d ominant area in Ni­
gerian exports , agricultural products were on a steady decline . 
What is also significant is the fact that despite the aims of 
the military government concerning the promotion of industrial 
economic development , manufactured goods also experienced a 
decline in their share of export earnings during the years of 
the second economic development program . 
As already discussed , the demise of agriculture was a sur­
prise to the economic planners in Nigeria · due to the fact that 
these planners had pro jected the ini'lated growth rates in agri­
oul tural production realized during the Civil War years as con­
tinuing in the post-war period. Economists forecast agricul­
t�ral production as providing 50 percent of the nation ' s  GDP 
in the immediate future , which they felt would be enough for 
local consumption needs as well as enough for export earn�ngs . 
-.... , -
Further ,  the forces of supply and demand seem to have had little 
effect at stemming the decline in agricultural production as the 
total production of cocoa in Nigeria fell from 350 , 000 tons in 
1970 to 196 , 000 tons in 1975-1976 , even though the world prices 
for cocoa beans have been soaring during the same period . Once 
the world ' s  la�gest producer of palm oil and groundnuts , Nigeria 
now must import both of these primary products to meet its own 
domestic needs . (Joseph, 197 8 ,  p .  231 ) •. 
Various reasons are given for the decline in agricultural 
production in Nigeria during the early 1970s and include s 
( 1 )  An inadequate land tenure system resulting in the 
fragmentation of holdings ( the prevalence of pea­
sant farmers ) s  
( 2 )  Low rate of yields due to unimproved crop vari­
(eties ,  _dee.lining fertility of the soil , under-use 
of fertilizers , and low levels of agricultural 
technology a 
( 3 )  Natural impediments such as droughts , crop disease , 
and infestation; 
( 4 )  Ins).lfficient capital resources were provid.ed during 
the first fifteen years of Nigeria ' s  independence 
( Joseph, 1978, p .  231-232 ) .  
Further evidence of the lack of concern with agricultural 
development is the fact that within Nigeria only 30 percent of 
the arable land is presently under cultivation. As a result 
of stagnation in the agricultural sector , by 1976 , �1 · 5  percent · 
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of Nigeria' s  domestic consumption needs had to be imported , in 
spite of the fact that at the start of the 1970s , that figure 
had been only 20 percent . (Fajana, 197 7 ,  p .  515 ) ·  
Import substitution was one method seen by Nigerian eco­
nomic planners as a means of all�viating the imbalan�e in export 
earnings and also inoreasing the nation ' s  industrial sector ' s  
share of the export market . Historically, import substitution 
had been viewed by the colonial administrators ·as a useful de­
vice for the development of internal economic struct\ires in 
Nigeria , although from the WWII period up until the late 1950s 
import substitution had been employed by the British for the 
exclusive purpose of the convertibility of sterling (as the Bri­
tish f�ced severe financial problems in their post-war economic 
development efforts themselves )  and had no real objectives in 
terms of Nigerian economic development . However ,  with indepen­
dence , industrialization became the primary objective behind the 
emphasis on the substitution of indigenous products for imported 
ones . Yet the efforts at successfully implementing an import 
substitution program have been continuoudly hampered in the past 
and the present by several problems including the widespread 
corruption found in government at all levels of· administration. 
Als o ,  decisions concerning s ubstitutions we�e often based on 
non-detailed and inadequate information and there was . also an 
inadequacy in enforcement mechanisms. (Fajana ,_ 197 7 ,  p .  517 ) .  
During the first development plan the primary means of at­
taining import substitutions had been through the application of 
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import tariffs on nonessential goods in order to encourage the 
growth of Nigerian consumer industries .  However, the interrup­
tion of the Civil War years and the rising importance of crude 
petroleum in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the balance of 
payments for Nigeria, meant , in reality, that the import bill 
of c onsumer goods dropped only 24 percent in its first seven 
years of the application 'of the substitution policy, and aside 
from fueling inflation because of the increased cost of many goods 
which have not become produced domestically, efforts at promot­
ing import substitution have often resulted in the promotion and 
maintenance of inefficient indigenous enterpris e s .  The textile 
and tobacco industries ,  for example , have had to rely heavily on 
high tariff protection, yet the export earnings of textiles has 
fallen by 46 . 2  percent . ( Ogbonna , 1976 • p .  296-297 ) .  
While in some areas import substitution. .appears to have 
been relatively successful such as the beer and stout industries , 
the import of such essential material for development such as 
cement actually increased during the 1970-1974 period , partially 
in response to an ambitious development program , but also par­
tialJy due· to the · ineffectiveness at the promotion of an indig­
enous cement industry. ( Ogbonna, 1976 , p.  298 ) .  
An overview of the policy of import substitution as effected 
during the first five years following the Civil War r�veals that 
several problems were beginning to surface , including the fact 
that since dependable internal markets are often lacking for 
certain manufactured good-s ,  the diversification of exports via 
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import substitutions is often very limited.  Cotton textiles 
is the only area where the domestic demand and supply has been 
gapped through the substitut�on policy. Also limiting the ex­
port capabilities of the substitutution orientation is the fact 
that as a large nation in terms �f population, Nigeria' s  large 
internal market often absorbs many goods which could be exported 
to earn foreign exchange : As previously indicated , the consump­
tion growth and productive capacities of the Nigerian economy 
have grown at appro�lmately equal rates . · A final point to be 
made concerning Nigeria' s  early efforts at promoting import sub­
stitution is the fact that since substitution has been concen­
trated in the final production stages , economic dependence on 
materials , parts ,  and components has been created .  ( Ogbonna , 
197$ , P· JOO ) .  
Potential future impacts of these efforts at import substi­
tution include the · lack of backward and forward linkage in this 
type 9f an industrialization program due to the fact that what 
industrialization which does take place is occurring s imply as a 
result of substitution policies and artificial protective bar­
riers without much real value being added. · Another point which 
must be considered is that while import substitution raises the 
per capita income leve l ,  it also redistributes the income level 
in favor of urbanites , whose expenditure patterns typically make 
up the highest proportion of all imports ,  especially imports of 
nonessential goods.  All in all , the most positive benefit o! 
the substitution policy, aside from the small savings in foreign 
exchange which were realized , has been the experience learned 
during the evolution of the process as . observed by various Ni­
gerian economic planners.  ( Ogbonna , 19? 6 ,  P• )01 ) .  
2 .  The Third Economic Development Plan, 1975-19801 
In 19?5 , a military coup replaced General Gowon, the 
leader of the military government for the previous seven years . 
This move , however , reflected politics much more than any spe­
cific dissatisfactions with economic policies other than the 
widespread corruption which had festered under Gowon' s  tenure . 
Since this paper' s major concern is the economic development 
during the 19?0s , it will not go into details concerning the pol­
itical maneuverings behind the 19?5 coup , and it-is mentioned pri­
marily ·to make the reader aware of the fact that during the first 
year of the third economic development plan, the nation ' s  leader­
ship changed ,  but the goals of the economic program had already 
been planned with the result that the new regime leadership was 
initially forced to merely play the role of an implementer in the 
area of economic development , although some specific changes were 
sought and will be detailed . later in this paper .  
As briefly discussed earlier, the oil boom of 19?3�19?4 , with 
the quadrupling in prices for crude petroleum , created something 
of an. aura of · over-optimism among Nigerian economic planners . 
However ,  the boom, in reality, lasted a little more than one year, 
and that year ' s  increase was due only to the price increases , not 
to any increases in productivity. Yet the third economic devel­
opment plan reflected the optimism of the 1974-19?4 period · and 
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the general feeling among economic planners was that for the near 
future there would be no financial restraints on Nigerian . economic 
development pro ject s .  In reality, the brevity o f  the oil boom is 
reflected in the fact that while Nigeria enjoyed a balance of 
payments surplus in 1975 of 158 million naira , in 1976 , it had 
a deficit of Z41 . 6  million naira , and by 1978 the government 
found it necessary to seek $1 billion in foreign loans due to 
the s lackening of oil prices at the same time that industrial and 
consumer goods were finally starting to really reflect the 1973-
1974 increase in crude petroleum price s .  ( Joseph , 1978 , p. 236 ) .  
One has to keep in mind that the third economic development 
plan was formulated during the 1973 period , and thus it reflected 
the affluence of that period as 45 billion naira was projected 
for spending on economic development , with JO billion coming from 
state and federal funding and 15 billion from private sources .  
Economic development and. growth pro jections were based on crude 
petroleum export earnings , which accounted for 85 percent of total 
export earnings , however ,  higher priority was finally being given 
to agricultural production. which had stagnated to the point where 
to not take heed at . the potential problems entailed by a further 
decline in agricultural output would have had serious consequences .  
Industrialization was also given a high priority in the 1975-1980 
development program as it reflected a desire by Nigerian economists 
to eventually have the nation ' s  e conomy compete , Japanese-styl e ,  
with the industrialized countries of the wor� . .. (Herskovits , 
i9?5, P ·  )18 ) .  
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A . O. Lewis does an extensive analysis of the objectives of 
the third development plan in a March . 1977 issue of DeveloDing 
Economies .. In his analysis of the objective s .  Lewis lists 
several ambiguous ones including the overall desire to establish 
the nation of Nigeria as a 
( 1 )  A united . strong . and self-reliant nations 
( 2 )  A great . and dynamic economic system s 
( 3 )  A just and egalitarian societys 
( 4 )  A land of bright and full opportunities for all of 
its citizens s · 
( 5 )  A free and democratic society. ( Lewi s .  197 7 .  p .  90 ) .  
Lewis goes further to define the methods listed by the Ni­
gerian economic planners as being necessary for the implementation 
of the above stated goals a 
( 1 )  Continuous increases in the per capita income leve l s  
( 2 ) . A more even distribution of incomes a 
( 3 )  A reduction in unemployment levels a 
( 4 )  An increase in the supply of high-level manpower a  
( 5 )  Economic diversification} 
( 6 )  Balanced economic development r 
( 7 )  Indigenization of economic activities.  ( Lewi s .  1977. 
P • 61 ) .  
S ome of the criticisms Lewis makes of the 1975-1980 plan are 
related to the ambiguity of some of the stated objectives of the 
plan. For instance . he cites the failure of the plan to . give 
concrete meanings to some of its objectives as being an imped-
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iment to tr�ly gauging the plan' s progres s .  Lewis further adds 
that some of the objectives are not only nebulous but not related 
t o  any specific time period and some of the o�jectives even ap­
pear to be contradictory, yet no attempts have been made to re­
concile the points of contention. He also finds evidence of an 
" overloading" of some of the objectives in order to make them 
more politically appealing. 
The emphasis placed by the planners on economic self-suf­
ficiency in turn relies on the assumption ,. · that oil will remain 
� potent force for - the forseeable future , yet the Nigerian sup­
plies are obviously limited and the effectiveness of petroleum 
to promote economic development in the specific Nigerian case 
has already been shown to have been over-ambitious . There is 
also a need to clarify what the :phrase " equitable economic 
distribution" encompasses and if indeed it is an attainable goal. 
The concept of balanced development also needs clarification-­
shou'i<! all states grow at equal rates or should not the compar­
ative _advantages of some of the states influence their individual 
growth potentials . (Lewis , 19? 7 .  p .  69 ) .  
The third economic development plan does recognize the need 
to promote agricultural production. and development and its policy 
to do so includes the following major points • 
( 1 )  Price and tax incentives to increase production; 
( 2 ) Subsidization of essential inputs to increase pro­
duction s 
( 3 )  The establishment of accessible agricultural credit ; 
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( 4 )  Increased ease of marketing and processing through 
the construction of the appropriate infrastructures 
and institutions ; 
( 5 )  The creation of a national extension service network ; 
( 6 )  Rehabilitation and new planting scheme s .  ( Lewis , 
197 7 .  P• 69-70 ) .  
Once again, Lewis has some specific criticisms of the -pro­
posed and already implemented agricultural policies contained 
within the 1975-1980 development plan. He feels , for instance , 
that some of the proposed measures for increasing agricultura l '  
production are based on an insufficient appreciation of the real 
problems confronting the agricultural sector in Nigeria. Spe­
cifically, the scarcity of labor in many rural areas ( due to the 
general rural-urban migratory trends being experienced in Nigeria 
as it is in the majority of the developing nations ) and the very 
real fact that increases in producer prices over the past ten 
years have not increased production (the already cited exampler 
of the decline in cocoa production ) .  
Lewis further feels that there is a need to balance the aid 
. . 
given to rural areas s o  it more evenly corresponds to urban aid 
(an obviously political as well as economic problem ) and the need 
· to get · industries ,  especially agro-related one s ,  to rural areas . 
He also sees the present system of peasant farming as being out­
dated and a need to replace it with larger farms which would be 
better able to utilize modern farming techniques and implements 
{not necessarily a move towards the massive collectivization such 
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as occurred in the Soviet Union i the average peasant holding in 
Nigeria ranges from 3 to ? acres and because of heredity and com­
munal rights which are widespread , the peasant acreage is con­
tinuously being further fragmented ) .  Along with this basis struc­
tural change in farming methods , ·Lewis sees a need to emphasize 
cooperation and cooperative ventures between various farmers and 
' 
the establishement of a netWQrk of state farms and plantations. 
( Lewis , 197 7 ,  P• 70 ) .  
Another major area in which Lewis faults the third economic 
development plan is in its relative absence of a regulatory 
framework for the private sector. In fact , he comments that at 
noticeable feature of the plan is the virtual absence of a reg­
ulatory. framework for the control of the economy. The only major 
fiscal concern seems to be the controlling of the money supply, 
easing import restrictions ( although is is necessary to promote 
indigenous development to maintain some sort of a tariff barrier ) ,  
and an increased government participation in foreign-owned bank s .  
In regards to manufacturing, the private sector is banned 
from investing in defense industries and security printing . The 
government al�o has a majority interest in all phases of · the pe­
troleum industry, but otherwise it appears that the planners 
. 
want�d to pursue a laizze faire economic program of development . 
Lewis particularly cites this last observation and points out 
that past history has shown that governments which do not conttol 
their economies cannot plan.. their development in an effective. 
manner .  Also the reliance solely on fiscal and �onetary con�rols 
. , 
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to curb in£lation in the past has never succeeded . ( Lewis , 197 7 ,  
P · 71-73 ) .  
3 .  The Indigenization Program s 
One of the major objectives of the 1975-1980 plan, the 
indigenization of the economy, deserves further elaboration since 
it is probably the one action which the new government has de-
. ' creed which has had the most impact on the original economic de-
velopment plan as prepared under the Gowon regime . The Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1977 set' a deadline of December 
3 1 ,  1978 for the Nigerianization of the enterprises specified 
under the Act , and by the original deadline , only 30 out of 1 , 120 
enterprises had not complied with the edict . 
�he policy of indigenization, or more accurately, Nigerian­
ization, had three major thrusts--the Nigerianization of personnel ,  
of ownership, and of control .  Enterprises were classified under 
three schedules a 
( 1 )  !he first schedule included enterprises reserved 
solely for Nigerians , and included advertising , 
public relations , blending and bottling of alcoholic 
drink s ,  candle manufacturing and all forms of gam­
ing, department strbes with less than a two million 
n�ira annual turnover , garme�t manufacturing, print­
ing, and travel agencies i 
( 2 )  The second schedule included those enterprises in 
which Nigerians must have a sixty percent equity, 
and consisted of boat-building, beer brewing , 
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clearing and forwarding agencie s ,  construction, 
commercial, merchant , and development banking , 
cement and fertilizer production, soaps and deter-
gent s ,  paper conversion, mining, insurance ,  and 
metal container manufacturing i 
' 
( J )  The third schedule , requiring at least 40 percent 
indigenous control ,  included drugs and medicine s ,  
engines and turbines ,  electrical appliances and 
housewares ,  watches and clocks , ·aircraft , and tex-
tile s .  (West Africa, 1979 . p .  )90 ) .  
The indigenization program sought to reduce Nigerian con­
centrations of wealth by stipulating that no person_ would have 
control of more than one enterprise which comes under the Act ' s  
jurisdiction. Schedule two and three enterprises are further 
required to reserve ten percent of their total equity shares or 
of the fraction of shares to be sold in affected enterprises for 
employees and ten percent of this share is to be �eserved for 
nonmanagerial staff. (West Africa , 19?9.  P• 390 ) .  
Few problems have been encountered surrounding the skills ' 
of the new Nigerian managers and entrepreeurs in the enterprises 
affected by the 1977 Decre e .  The predicted decline in foreign 
investments has not materialized and inefficiencies are not in-
creasing. However ,  one area of concern is the shortage of high­
l��el manpower , which in some areas remains acut e .  The Federal 
Civil Service has a 55 percent vacancy rate for senior adminis-
trative staff, including a 6� percent vacancy rate for engineers 
and surveyors , a 45 percent figure for senior administrators 
and managerial staff, and a 60 percent rate for technical staff. 
(West Africa , 1979 , p .  391 ) .  
4 .  The Results of the 1975-1980 Development Plan: 
The Economist was already noting significant progress 
which was being made under the 1975-1980 economic development 
plan after only its first year in operation. �conomic growth 
in 1976 was ten percent after a sluggish . 2 . 8  percent figure in 
197$. Inflation was also cut in 1976 to 20 percent after reach­
ing the 30 percent figure in 1975 , with an attainable ultimate 
goal of six percent annually being considered feasible ny the 
year 1980. Further ,  a diversification of the economic base is 
being detected and hopes for an industrial breakthrough are being 
pinned on iron and steel, as well as oil and petrochemical pro­
duction. British Petroleum and Shell were in 1977 already dis­
cussing ·t .1e construction of a liquified natural gas plant to 
produce at least one billion cubic feet of gas a day and the 
government has set aside 1 . 7  billion naira for the natural gas 
industry to use for its development scheme s .  (The Economist , 
' - ·  
197 7 ,  P •  103-104 ) .  
In addition, new refineries are being built at Kaduna at a 
cost of $600 miliion and at Warri for $215 million, and the ex­
isting refinery at Port Hartcourt has been expanded . Als o ,  a 
huge network of pipeline is still under construction and eventually 
will link the new refineries to the oil fields . American aid is 
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now being channelled into certain specific development projects 
and it is coming none too soon as the Soviets already in 1977 
were deeply involved in designing the blast furnance being built 
at A jaokuta in the Kwara Stat e .  Other industrialization pro jects , 
including cement works , . pulp and · paper factories , vehicle manu­
facturing plant s ,  and a fertilizer complex will bring industrial 
' 
investment to a total of $8 billion by 1980. (The Economist , 1977 . 
P•  10) ) .  
More specifically, 29 pe rcent of the GDP is set to go into 
economic investment by 1980 and big efforts are being made to 
improve the transportation infrastructure as new berthing fa­
cilities have been completed on Tin Can Island . Other infra­
structure projects .include a new hydro-electric .power station 
t o  be built at Jebba and a network of much needed good roads 
covering the entire nation. (The Economist , 1977 r p .  103 ) .  
The optimism expressed by ��e Economist after the third 
economic development plan had been in operation for only one 
year , must be regarded as a guarded optimism at best , partic­
ularly when one considers the economic data from the years since 
the ·plan has been · i� force . For instance , in its first year, 
1975,  the cost of the five year plan to the federal and state 
governments had already increased from the original figure of 
30 billion naira to 42 billion, a difrerence of 40 percent in 
just one year of operation. Total trade for the year 1975 in­
creased by only 14. 7  percent compared. to the 19?� figure of· · 
154 · 3  percent , which of course reflected the increase in the 
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world mar�et price for crude petroleum. Exports alone fell 15- 1 
percent in 1975 with t�e value of petroleum export earnings drop­
ping 870 . 4 - million naira during that year. Agricultural production 
continued to decline as the food import pill for the 1975-19?6 
period alone was 354 million naira , and increase of 800 percent 
from the 1969-1970 period . (Africa Research Bylletin, .19Z( , p. 
4127-4129 ) .  
The statistics for the year of 19?6 , however,  seem to re­
flect that the economic development plan was starting to have 
s·ome positive effects . Whereas economic growth had been only 
2 . 8  percent during 1975 .  this figure had increased to ten percent 
during 1976 , with the oil sector alone growing by 14. 8  percent . 
Agricultural production increased during 1976 by three percent , 
a figure which while it may appear low, is a positive sign . when 
one considers the agricultural growth rate of only one percent 
recorded during 1975·  Investments in machinery and transportation 
grew by five percent during the 1976 period and ·by 32 . 8  percent in 
constrµction. However, imports alone grew by 38 percent during 
that same year while exports rose by only 30 percent . As a re­
sult of the latter figures ,  import restrictions were· imposed by 
the federal government with a number of items being banned from 
· being imported , including beer bottles , galvanized buckets , spa 
water ,  carbon paper, lace , and all cars over 2500 cc . Still a 
trade surplus was recorded in 19?6 of 1 . 57 billion naira with 
total exports of 6 •. 7 1  billion naira and imports of 5 . 14 billion. 
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Aga .. in the predominance of petroleum products as an export earner 
is illustrated by the fact that they accounted for 6 . 281 billion 
naira out of the 6 . 71 billion total . (Africa Research Bulletin . 
1977 • P· 4236 ) • 
· 1n more specific terms . increases in certain areas of pro-
duction were realized during the first years of the plan as are 
' 
illustrated by the following tables a 
Table VI--Nigerian Cocoa Production, 1975�1978 { thousands 
of tons ) s  
( 1 )  1975-1976 
(2 )  19?6-1977 
( 3 )  1977-1978 
p .  4681-1+684 ) .  
215 . 0  
165 . 0 
210 . 0 (Africa Research Bulletin. 1978 . 
While production in this area did actually decline du�ing 
these years . the relative stability enjoyed in cocoa production 
and · the trend which Nigerian economists have pro jected for the 
1980s seems to have ·created an air of optimism concerning this 
primary commodity. 
'Table VII--Nigerian Cement Production, 1973· ·197Z ( t ons ) t  
Year Imports Domestic Output Total 
1973 868 , 766 1 . 242 , 674 2 , 110 . 440 
1974 1� 953 . 960 1 . 245, 739 3 , 199 , 697 
1975 1 , 765, 982 1 , 383, 504 3 , 149. 486 
1976 1 , 988 , 219 1 , 273 , 504 3 , 26 1 , 723 
1977 4 , 747 , 388 1 , 439 , 793 6 , 187 , 181 (Afri2a 
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Research Bulletin, 1978 , p .  4291 ) .  
�able VIII--Nigerian Coffee Production, 1976-1978 ( thous­
ands of bags ) a  
1976-1977 30 . 0  
1977-1978 80. 0 
' 
1978-1979 7 5 . 0 (estimated ) .  (Africa Research Bulletin, 
1979 , P •  4958 ) .  
By 1979,  however ,  the hard data seemed to indicate that per­
haps the time for optimism had run its course as exports for 
1978 had dropped by 20. 5 percent to a total figure of 6 . 064 bil­
lion naira While imports had jumped 15. 8  percent to reach 8 . 211 
billion for a deficit of 2 . 14 billion naira. In contrast ,  during 
1977 a net surplus in the balance of payments of 537 million 
� 
naira had been realized. Petroleum still dominated exports but 
had declined somewhat to a 89 percent share of total exports as 
• 
compared to the figure of 92 . 8  percent in 1977· Agricultural 
exports �ew only marginall:y· from 437 . 9  million naira in value � . 
in 1977 to 440 . 8  million in 1978,  but at the same time the value 
of imported foodstuffs alone rose from 736 . 4  million naira in 
, 
· 1977 to 1 . 0  billion naira in 1978 , · with rice costs increasing r 
by 13 · 5  p�rcent during that year, and accounting for -175 . 8  mil­
lion naira of the imported food costs . (Africa Research Bulletin, 
. 
1979 , P •  5061 ) .  
The -Oudget priorities of the federal government seemed to 
� . 
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reflect a concern with fostering of domestic economic develop­
ment as the data in the following tables indicates.a 
Table IX--Nigerian Capital Expenditures, 1979-1980 ( naira ) a  
( 1 )  Agricultural Development 34 . 347 million; 
' ( 2 )  C ommunications 831 , 010; 
( 3 )  
I 
Defense 520. 000 millioni 
( 4 )  Economic Development 2 7 . 638 million·; •  
( 5 )  Education 326. 076 million ; 
( 6 )  National Science and Technical 3 3 . 032 million; 
- Development 
(Africa Research Bulletin, 1979 , p .  5061 ) .  
The allocation of government spedning for the 1979-1980 
period similarly reflects the priorities placed by the govern­
ment in the area of development" 
Table X--Nigerian Budgetary Allocations, 1978-1979 ( naira ) a  
. ( l. )  
( 2 )  
( 3 )  
( 4 )  
( .5 )  
( 6 ) 
Defense 
Agricultural Development 
Communications 
Education 
Economic Development and 
Construction 
National Science and Technical 
Development 
.597 · 8.57 million; 
19 . 711 million s 
380 , 5000 ; 
779. 312 million; 
�7· 714 millioni 
30. 450 million. 
(Africa Research Bulletin, 1979 . p. 4646 ) .  
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Observations of budgeting allocations do seem to illustrate 
one pertinent fact concerning the priorities of the Nigerian gov­
ernment--the predominance of defense within budgetary considera­
tions . This trend was first detected in 1977 and as the 1976 
figures became known it was apparent that defense expenditures 
were accounting for approximately 25 percent of the recurrent 
spending and the Nigerian army, numbering 250 , 000,  is the largest 
on the African continent and reflects , to a very large extent , 
the fact that it has been military men who have been running the 
government since 197 0 .  The importance placed · on defense spending 
is of concern especially when once considers the relative inef­
ficiencies of defense-related industries in regenerating i�1comes 
in the w�stern industrialized nations , especially when compared 
to non-defense related enterpris e s .  The multiplier effect when 
applied to defense-related industries is not nearly has high as 
when compared to non-defense dinsustries and so in effect the 
placing of high priorities on defense spending means that. in 
the long run , the Nigerian economy cannot real i_ze as full of a 
potential than if the investments and budgetary priorities were 
skewed in· another . direction. 
When one observes the other primary areas of capital ex­
penditures and budget allocations it does . · appear as if the gov­
ernment in Nigeria is finally realizing just where its major 
deficiencies are in terms of economic development . Both agri­
culture and · education are receiving significant inputs from thr 
government in terms of capital investments and annual budget 
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allocations and the development of science and technology as well 
as other basic infrastructures are receiving higher priorities than 
they have in the past.  
5 .  Major Areas of Concern During the 1975-1979 Period • 
A .  Overspending by the Government s 
Perhaps the biggest problem inherited by the new 
regime in 1975 was the tendency towards overspending exhibited 
by General Gowon based on his and his advisers overestimations 
of the continuing importance of crude petroleum as a financier 
of economic development for the foreseeable future . By 1978 , 
as already noted , the federal government was forced to seek 
$1 billion in loans from overseas , primarily from the British. 
Efforts to secure loans from the French ran into early problems 
due to the fact that in 1975.  Nigeria ordered far too much ce­
ment from international suppliers and then was forced to back 
out of some of the contracts , resulting in legal actions being 
direct�d against the government . Eventually, the Nigerian govern­
ment made a settlement of $6 . 5  million, but even this did not 
increase the faith which other suppliers had in the Nigerian 
government or its economy. {The Economist , 197 8 ,  p.  iJ? ) .  
Government deflation efforts in 1978 reflected its growing 
. . 
· concern and awareness of its overspending problem and almost 
all companies showed a fall in profits during the 1978 period . 
In April of that year a severe budget was introduced by the 
government as falling oil revenue , soaring imports ,  high infla-
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tion, and an excess growth of the money supply were all prevalent 
and afflicting the health of the Nigerian economy • .  Measures in­
troduced by the government included a hefty credit squeeze and 
tight exchange controls with imp�rters being asked to make ad­
vance deppsits of often 100 percent on all consumer imports and 
many import duties were �ncreased . 
In addition, the imposition of the Import Prohibition Order 
of 1978, banned the importing of a wide r�nge of items that could 
be manufactured domestically including fresh milk , beet sugar , 
pasta, beer, footwear , carpets , furniture , jewelery, matche s ,  
frozen meats , candles , eggs , clothing, cameras , electronic equip­
ment , and spirits . (The Economist, .19?8, p .  ?8-79 ) .  
B .  Ethnicity and Economic Development • 
The importance of ethnicity in the political devel­
opment of the Nigerian nation has already been alluded to as well 
as the ef·�gcts �thnicity and conflicts surrounding this concept 
and applications of it can have on economic development as well.  
Charles Nixon went even further in a study of cultural ties and 
economic development and. discovered that where cultural groups 
are adaptive to new situations and where new economic opportun­
ities arise ,  cultural ties will be an important factor in select­
ing individuals to fill the new economic roles and will thus 
condition the manner ip which new economic classes are developed 
within the society. Specific examples cited are the communal 
ties which shaped the development of cattle marketing in Ibadan 
and the fact that credit was handled through communual controls 
not the courts.  Further: illustrating his contention was the fact 
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that kola nuts were grown by Yorubas , but were bought , trans­
ported , and distributed by the Hausas (who also provided the 
cattle for marketing and credits ) .  ( Nixon, 1974, p .  J9 ) .  
Nixon also found from his research that major cultural groups 
in Nigeria stand as rivals in both economic as well as political 
spheres and each cultural group can be seen as consisting of a 
full range of economic class differentials within its membe�­
ship. He also discovered that political leadership in each of 
the major cultural groups reflected economic class position and 
g3:ve the example of Dr • . Azikiwe as being not only the political 
leader of the Ibos , but also one of the most successful modern 
entrepreneurs . Also the wealthier cocoa farmers and traders in 
the Western Region tended to join together with the traditional 
Yoruba leaders to provide political leadership. ( Nixon, 1974, · 
P •  5 1 )  • 
In terms of cu·1 tural representation within economic enter-
prises., John Harris discovered that the Edo ,  Yoruba , and Ibo 
groups were overrepresented in entrepreneurial activities , while 
Ibibo,  Efic , I jaw, Hausa-Fulani , and other groups were under­
re-presented . (Harris , 1970 , p .  J01-J04 ) .  This underre·pi:-esentation 
by some groups at the expense of others in entrepreneurial ac-
�i vi ties is significant when one considers the degree of uneven 
economic development Which can and in the pas has resulted be­
tween the various regions within Nigeria because of the specific 
occupational orientations within those different regions. Harris 
furttreT contends that entrepreneurial mobility is affected by 
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ethnic identification as the lack of geographical mobility be­
tween regions is striking and the inter-provincial �obility is 
similarly limited .  While entrepreneurial activity has been a 
source of upward mobility in many instances , intergenerational 
and individual occupational mobility is also limited as is status 
mobility by ethnic identifications . (Harris , 1970, P •  30� ) .  
c .  · Economic Development and Community Developments 
One particular area in which the federal government 
appears to have erroneously tried to revise the traditional eco­
nomic method of production is within the Ibo communities of the 
East Central State . The Ibos of that region have long been 
highly reputed for their community development efforts which are 
initiated and implemented through voluntary organizations called 
at various time s .  deve lopment· unions , improved unions , town unions . 
or age grades ,  and these pro jects are unde rtaken without any 
direct governmerit backing. 
However ,  in spite of the past successes within the �bo de­
velopment pro jects , the East Central government still felt it 
necessary, with support from the federal government , to enact the 
Development Administration Edict of 1971 ,  which established com­
munities as the fundamental administrative units in place of the 
previously utilized country organizational apparatus . Councils 
were created at levels where democratic processes in Western tra­
ditions are established with the ultimate goal of reducing to a 
minimum the prevailing local rivalries and. tensions ( something 
that still prevails in even the most politically-developed Western 
political systems ) .  Another aim of the Edict was to fully utilize 
local resources and allow the local people to effective control 
their own affairs . (Harris , 1979, p. 305 ) .  
It soon became apparent that there were serious structural 
deficiencies in the proposed and .implemented governmental pro­
grams . Due to the placing of councils in indigenous areas the 
selections of council members are often based not on elective 
method s ,  and indigenous and traditional ideas pervade the de­
cision making processe s .  The decentralization tendencies of 
the program are carried out to the point where 6�0 councils are 
presently doing the same work that 105 county ones did previously 
and over 200 of the newly established counceils have individual 
jurisdictions of only 200 residents with the result that most 
of the councils are too small and lack the vitality to perform 
the broad range of functions assigned to them. Also , many of the 
powers given to the councils were previously performed by cul­
tural unions , which naturally resent the usurption of their powers . 
Under the cultural union system, wealth, and often more capable , 
individuals considered it an honor to . serve , and the org�nizations 
as a .result were more respected , while under the council system, 
corruption in the selection process prevails and partisanship 
rather than professionalism dominates the planning and implemen­
tation processe s .  (Ez e ,  1976 , P• 155 ) .  
Financial problems have also been encountered under the 
new council plan as the raising of revenue is made difficult 
by the fact that 77 . 5  -Percent of all revenues a� . defrived from 
,, . 
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sources which are easily evaded. License fees are being con­
t inuously reduced as a percentage of financing due to poor col­
lection techniques and evasion is rampant . Expenditure problems 
are also enoucntered due to the fact that the councils are too 
small to handle the size of many· of the projects as their work 
loads are much more burdensome than those of the counties and 
\ 
cultural unions had been, yet the councils are much smaller ad-
ministrative units . (Eze,  1976 , p .  157-161 ) .  
D ·  The Prevalence of Tax Evasions s 
One of the major problems facing the federal and state 
governments is in the area of revenue collection due to the pre­
valence of tax evasions by Nigerians engaged in commercial ac­
tivities . An individual may arrange a business venture in such 
a way that details of it may not be ascertainable for proper 
assessment . Further, the assessment authorities base taxes only 
on declared assets and incomes and tax assessment and collection 
has been deplorable in the past,  and it is only in the Northern 
states that authorities have been able to manage efficient asses­
sment and collection procedures • 
. · personal income taxes have never constituted a significant 
proportion of total government revenue as 50 percent of Nigerian 
revenues in the past have been derived from indirect taxe s ,  taxes 
which are considerably more regressive in nature . Companies also 
benefit from the tax system as profits taxation allows very gen­
erous deductions before taxable income is determined ,  yet as has 
. ' 
already been discussed , increases in industrialization efforts' 
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by indigenous entrepreneurs is not proceeding at the pace anti­
cipated or desired by the government . ( Ogbonna , 1975. p.  54-57 ) .  
E .  · Manpower Needs and Educational Development s 
Nigeria' s  manpower situation is presumed to be so cru-
cial to the economic future that it is commonly believed that 
shortages of skilled labor , rather than investment capital or 
foreign exchange would be the most likely hindrance to Nig�rian 
economic development over the long range . Typically, analysts 
have prescribed solutions to these shortages which are · in the best 
traditions of libera l ,  generally Western, economic-oriented , and 
capitalist theories of economic development . There has in the 
past been an assumption that a virtual automatic correlation 
exists between a society' s level of formal education and its level 
of economic growth and development as well as the belief that the· 
correct mix of formal education is necessary to ensure the pro­
per proportion of different graduates which the nation' s devel- � 
opment�l policies require . (Anosike , 197 7 .  p .  27-29 ) .  
Orthodox Western manpower theory regards the development of 
human capital as the principle source of every nation' s deve1-
. . . 
opment and in . fact replaces the emphasis on net investment of cap-
ital with human investments . The educational component of the 
· labor force is seen as a partner in the production process and 
that the link between the production of physical goods and ser­
vices and the educational system is productivity itself. In the 
the application· of these Western orientations to Nigerian edu� 
cational theory and actual practice,  one discovers that formal 
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education has become the principle avenue for transmitting tech­
nical and general capability skills to the nation' s labor force . 
However ,  sizable unemployment prevails among the educated elites 
primarily because of the imbalance between the educational struc­
tures and the real needs of the c ountry. (Anosike , 19??,  p. 30 ) .  
The contributions of formal education to development may 
be generally summarized as the following major benefits s 
( 1 )  An increase in the skill-learning potential ( but 
formal ·education may not perform a vital role in 
the upgrading of productive skills ) i  
( 2 )  Over an individual' s  lifetime , formal education has 
a greater rate of economic return than e ither on­
the-job training or adult education programs : 
( 3 )  Education influences occupational attainment and 
income . (Anosike , 1977, P ·  31 ) .  
However ,  formal education is not a panacea to cure all of 
the manpower shortages facing Nigeria. For instanc e ,  education 
may not increase productivity as is evident from observing the 
increasing educational levels of Western industrialized nations 
-
at the same time th�t their productivity among workers is levelling 
off or even declining. Also,  while the skill levels demanded by 
Nigeria . have increased , in contrast to the industrialized world , 
large numbers of low-skill level jobs exist in developing coun­
tries and the skill levels demanded by specific industries may 
in many instances be inappropriate to the real labor needs for a 
particular industry (the emphasis on " over-education" which . is so 
prevalent in Western societies ) .  (Anosike , 197 7 .  P •  32-33 ) .  
There have been several consequences which have resulted 
from Nigeria' s  emulation of Western educational systems and they 
include all of the following : 
( 1 )  The educational system has been put unde r  and in­
tolerable strain and has shown signs of beginning 
to break downr • 
( 2 )  The d emand for teachers has become the single big­
gest factor in determining the size of higher ed­
ucation, and about one-half of all graduates from 
Nigerian universities become teachers ( a  role which 
in the short-run adds very little to real levels of 
economic productivity ) r  
( J )  The fiscal burden of establishing an educational 
infrastructure is enormous i 
( 4 )  White collar unemployment continues to accelerate i 
( 5 )  On-the-job training and other informal procedures 
of upgrading already ·e mployed workers. are neglected i 
( 6 )  A serious "brain-drain" and :foreigil emigration of 
the oyer-educated but indigenous elites continues : 
( 7 )  Skills are o:ften produced in advance of real needs . 
(Anosike , 197 7 .  p.  41-42 ) .  
In 1977.  a White Paper was issued entitled a.s the " National 
Policy on Education" and within it there was established national 
objectives for the education of all the citizenry as one method 
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of ensuring national integration and education was seen aslo as 
being the most fundamental instrument of change , political, so­
cial, and economic .  ( Again reflecting Lipset ' s  contentions of the 
correlations between educational levels and economic and political 
development ) .  Concern with agricultural productivity was also 
reflected in the Paper with stipulations that educational systems 
must participate in agriculture and a percentage of educat�on 
finances were devoted to technology and science with the opening 
of more colleges of technology and polytechnics .  Educational 
institutions were also established for gifted children and all 
children, including those with physical, mental ,  and learning 
difficultie s ,  are provided for within the educational system. 
A need was also recognized for intensifying and diversifying 
university programming for the development of a higher level of 
manpower for the needs of the e conomy and local industries were 
encouraged to develop direct links with research institutions 
�nd Ur.iversiti e s .  (West Africa , 1978, p.  1882-1883 ) .  
The Nigerian government has also launched a massive pro­
gram of sending students overseas , particularly to the United 
> 
States and Great Britain in order to make
.
up for the crucial 
shortages in administrative , managerial,  and engineering pos­
itions which were discussed earlier. During the 1976-1977 per­
iod , 1 1 , 870 Nigerian students were enrolled in instutions of 
higher education in the United States alone . The government 
hopes that it can fill its manpower shortages ,  at least during 
the short-run ·through the exporting of these students to attain 
Western educations . (Higher Education Daily ,  1978 , p.  J ) .  
F .  The Future of Agricultural neve lopment a 
Nigeria' s  pro jected food deficits for the near future 
almost equals that of India, with production increasing only . 5  
percent annually while the population increases at a 3 . 0  percent­
age rat e .  Production needs to grow at a 4 . 8  to 5 . 5 percentage 
annual rate to meet the 1990 population and consumption projec-
' 
tions . In 1975,  agricultural production amounted to 18 , 741 metric 
tons while consumption was 2 8 , 763 metric tons . By 1990,  pro­
duction will have risen (if present trends continue ) to only 
19, 304 metric tons while consumption will be anywheres from J J , 928 
metric tons (under conditions meeting 110 percent of energy re­
quirements ) ,  to 39 , 835 metric tons (under rapid economic growth 
pro jections ) .  There' is also a need to increase the production of 
cereals because historically, as per capita incomes rise in de­
veloping nations the tendency is generally that consumption pre­
ferences 1witch from root crops to grains and grain-fed beef, 
both areas currently experiencing declines in Nigerian agricul­
tural production. (Food Needs Of Developing Countries a Projections , 
of Production and Consumption to 1990 , 1977 . P •  19 ) .  
The fact that many of the land holdings of the peasants are 
relatively �mall has already been discussed , but another factor 
that serves as an impediment to increasing agricultural production 
is the prevalence of communal holdings in certain regions of Ni­
geria . The communal holding is a traditional method �f land 
tenure in Nigeria in whieh the co�unity possesses the land in 
perpetuity and individuals residing in the community (determined 
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by traditional ethnic identifications ) ,  are entitled to farm 
land appropriated for their individual use .  In fact , the prac­
tice of selling land was unknown in Nigeria until 1852 , and its 
practice was halted in Western Nigeria in 1913 because it was 
feared it was destroying the communal system. ( Ike , 1977, p .  189 ) .  
In comparing the pr9ductivity of the communal system of land 
tenur and the freeholder system, one finds that the average in­
c�me and average income per cultivated acre was larger for the 
freeholder ( $1 , 072 versus $780 in annual income and $60 versus 
$45 per acre ) .  Also it is evident that the freeholder culti­
vates a greater proportion of the land that under the communal 
system (63 percent versus 51 percent ) and this is very important 
in a nation which has only JO percent of its arable land under 
cultivation. ( Ike , 197 7 ,  P• 19) ) .  
One last area under the present system of agriculture needs 
to be di ·. cussed because of its negative effects on attempts to 
raise productivity levels , and that is the propensity fvr Ni­
gerian farmers , whether under the freeholder or communal systems , 
towards multiple-cropping as opposed to a concentration on sin-
. . 
gle-cropping. Studies have shown that the preferences of Ni­
gerians is to use multiple-cropping as a hedge agains market 
fluctuations affecting one ·crop and the fact that land holdings 
in Nigeria are so small and peasants are often engaged in sub­
sistence farming, requiring a variety of crops . Agricultural 
information concerning increasing productivity seems to indicate 
that movements towards higher concentrations of holdings and the 
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specialization accompanying single-croppings in the long-run 
are more beneficial for improving the con�ributions of the ag­
ricultural sector of the community towards overall national 
economic development . 
Two major strategies are recommended for Nigerian rural 
development in the late 1970s and the early 1980s for fostering 
agricultural development by 1985 :  the expansion of exports of 
agricultural products and the creation of lead time to feed the 
masses by investing in research and development programs . Three 
specific policies are seen as necessary to implement these two 
strategies : 
( 1 )  The provision to farmers of more fa�orable incen­
tives through reducing taxes on producers ; 
( 2 )  Granting of short-run subsidies to farmers who 
produce high pay-off crops and the establishment 
of productivity campaigns ; 
( 3 )  The privision of infrastructural support , including 
rrsearch, extension credit , and other supporting 
services for both strategies . (Eicher and Johnson , 
19?0 , p .  385 ) .  
4 .  Summary of the Third Development Plan, 1975-198 0 1  
The four years since the implementation of the third 
economic development plan have been years of both highs and lows 
for the Nigerian economy. Positive trends have been detected 
including the constructing of an expansive iron and steel pro ject 
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in Kwara State which is expected to cost a a minimum 20 million 
naira ( including geological explorations and the establishment 
of metallurgical laboratories ) under the auspices of Soviet- . 
trained members of the Nigerian Steel Development Authority is 
just one example of efforts an industrializing the economy: · Ni­
geria presently imports +· 5 million tons of steel a year but by 
1981 the Kwara pro ject will be able to produce . 5  million tons 
of steel products annually and thus save the Nigerian economy some 
400 million naira a year in foreign exchange . (West Africa, 197 7 ,  
p �  1963 ) .  
It also appears as if the true value of petroleum and its 
by-products is being reevaluated as the sole means necessary for 
financing economic development programs and import substitution 
and indigenization programs are being aimed at the promotion of 
a Nigerian indust�ial infrastructure . The demand for money within 
the economy is stable , though control over the money supply is 
difficult to maintain through open market operations since large 
interest rate changes are not feasible due to external restraints 
.{bai,ance of payment problems ) and domestic requirements (govern- . 
ment financing pro jects ) .  (Ajayi , 1977 , p .  54 ) .  Still it appears 
that inflation is finally being taken seriously , and efforts over 
the· past few years have reduced its annual rate considerably. 
Serious problems do remain, particularly in the area of 
transportation infrastructures .  In genera l ,  the Nigerian trans­
portation system is characterized by �oor coordination , misin­
vestments , operational deficit s ,  a lack 00f maintenance ,  an in-
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adequage utilization of human and natural resources ,  and poor 
management and operational control .  ( Nwosu, 197 7 ,  p .  24) . 
In 1970, only J 0 , 000 miles of roads out of a total of 5 5 , 000 
were paved and those roads being used presently are being abused 
by heavy truck and bus traffic . 'The national railway system was 
established in 1898 but has operated in a deficit since 1969. 
The freight liftings of the train network have substantially 
declined from 850, 000 tons in 1958-1959 to 350 ,�oo tons in 
1910-1971 and the operations further have' deteriorated between 
1971 and 197*· The track system was constructed between 1898 and 
1965 and much of it is now obsolete and does not even have a 
standard size guage . The 2 , 178 miles of track are characterized 
by extensive track curvature , lightweight rail s ,  weak bridges , 
steep grades , and obsolete signalling systems . Defects in the 
diesel engine s ,  heavy backlogs in maintenance and repair wor� , 
extensive detention times at stations , poor passenger facilities , 
and a poor communication system further aggravates the effective­
ness of the national rail network. ( Nwosu, 1977 , p .  26 ) .  
Port facilities in light of the oil boom, have proven to 
be wh�lly inadequate ,  though several ·new berthing operatings 
have been under construction and some have now been completed . 
Port delays in 1975 were five to six weeks and imposed staggering 
difficulties on importers , exporters , and dom�stic customers 
alike . The Nigerian Airways was established in 1959 and has a 
nonopoly on all domestic air traffic ,  yet ,  because of management 
. .  
problems the corporation has yet t o  realize a profit on its do-
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mestic business , and service is not dependable as flight sched­
uli'ng and waiting times are unpredictable . Deficiencies are 
also apparent in areas of engineering , maintenance , communications . 
eq�ipment , accommodations and support facilities . ( Nwosu, 1977, 
P •  29-32 ) • 
Another major problem inherent in the implementation of the 
' 
1975-1980 economic developme.nt program is the prevalence of · 
corruption within all levels of governmel'.lt · In 1975 alone , 
11 , 000 public employees were dismissed because of corrupt prac­
tices and ten out of twelve governors under Gowon' s  regime were 
subsequently found guilty of appropriating $16 million for their 
own private use .  ( Nwosu, 1977, p. 34 ) .  
Richard Joseph does an analysis of the progress made under 
the 1975-1980 national economic development plan in a June , 1978 
issue of The Journal of Modern African Stud ies , particularly in 
the area �f industrial deve lopment . He finds little real pro­
gress has been made because all power plants , military hardware , 
transport machinery ,_ railroad equipment , iron and steel products 
( t o  be domestically produced in part by 198 1 ) ,  e lectrical and 
electronic goods , and many other manufactured goods are still 
being imported . These goods are in many instances too essential 
to the maintenance and development of the economy to be taxed at 
a much higher rate and domestic entrepreneurs are often hesitant 
to attempt to establish indigenous enterprise s .  ( Joseph, 1978 , 
p .  225 ) .  
Joseph further sees little hope for the solving of these 
-82-
imbalances in the near future , as the basic engineering sub-sector 
for the production of machinery ,equipment and capital goods ac­
c ounts for less than three percent of all value-adde d ,  and the 
basic metal industry for only 1 . 5  percent , while 50 p��cent is 
provided in manufacturing ( primarily from food , beverages ,  to­
bacc o ,  textiles , and clothing ) .  He believes that Nigeria lacks 
' 
an effectiv: agency of industrialization and also finds indig-
enous entrepreneurs interested only in quick returns such as are 
d�rived from traditional trading activities and generally reluc­
tant to invest in industrial enterpris e s .  Many of the traditional 
values associated with an emergent capitalist class are absent 
among the Nigerian peoples and in place of austerity and dedi-
cation, .  one often finds extravagant consumption and the " group 
of companies'' mentality instead of individual initiative and 
enterpris e .  ( Joseph, 1978 , p .  226-227 ) .  
v .  Conclusions a 
1 .  Economic Development During the 1970� 1 
The major orientation of this paper was to .explore tha 
economic development of the nation of Nigeria during the ' decade 
of the 1970s . Gutland and Wallerstein ' s  concept of political 
economy was utilized in explaining the prevalence of conditions 
of underdevelopment found within Nigeria after the granting of 
independence in 1960. The myths perpetuated by Euro-centric 
historians , political scientists ,  and economists who denied the 
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eKistence of political or economic development in the African 
c ontinent were refuted as definite instances of both economic 
and politibal development were cited in the Nigerian study. The 
far-reaching effects of the imposed colonial system on the economic 
and political development of the Nigerian nation were also ex­
plored as well as the ramifications these effects were to have 
' 
once independence was realized.  
The specific problems facing the economic development of 
Nigeria at the onset of its first major development program were 
touched upon as were the political events preceding the Biafran 
War and the regional and ethnic diversities which touched off 
that war and have affecyed the political and economic develop-
mental efforts throughout its history, pre-colonial, colonial , ·  
and post-colonial eras all included . Finally, the paper concen­
trated its analysis on the efforts at economic development 
as political stability was achieved in the 1970s . Throughout 
the entire paper the concern expressed with the economic de­
velopment of Nigeria was explained in the theories of such 
stholars of development as S eymour Llpset who contend that a 
correlation exists between levels of economic development and 
subsequent efforts at the promotion of political development . 
The conclusions reached connerning the future of economic 
development in Nigeria are centered around the belief that the 
nation still possesses the potentials to become the leading Af­
rican nation during the decade of the 1980s . It has a relative 
abundance of natural and human resources and petroleum supplies 
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ample enough , if carefully exploited along with serious efforts 
at the promotions of industrialization and agriculture , to fi­
nance the development programs of the government in the 1980s . 
However, serious problems remain to be solved--the stagnation of 
agricultural production means that the nation pays a staggering 
import bill of one billion dollars annually just for food pro­
ducts which could be produced domestically. Only 30 percent of 
the arable land is currently under cultivation, but rural areas 
are facing labor shortages due to migratory trends to urban areas 
and agricu�tural technology remains backward and productivity 
relatively inefficient due to structural deficiencies ( the frag­
mentation of land holdings due to the prevalence of communal and 
peasant farming methods as well as the prevalence of multiple­
cropping ) and at times agricultural production has even been 
unresponsive to the market incentives ,  both domestically and 
internationally. 
Serious problems also exis"t in the shortages of high level 
administrative and managerial personnel as well as in technical 
positions . The nation ' s  large proportion o� the population under 
the ' age of sixteen means an /jnqrmous investment in an educational 
infrastructure must be spen� with corresponding increases in pro­
ductivity not to be realized in the short-run. A total lack of 
emphasis on informal training is also evident and so no present 
system exists for the upgrading of already employed workers. 
Important areas of the nation ' s  transportation infrastruc­
ture also need to be constructed and/or upgrade d .  The fact that 
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the major transportation systems are nationalized b.ut. still have 
yet to realized any profit in their operations means that per­
haps some alternative ownership and/or management systems need to 
be considered . Economic development depends on the early devel­
opment of an efficient transportation system as the British-
financed national railroad system in the United Stat�s was what 
' 
made possible ·the opening up . of the Western frontiers and the 
exploitatipn of the resources necessary for subsequent indus­
trialization. 
Positive signs are present , specifically the stability of 
the demand for money, and the fact that the government has come 
to recognize many of the areas needing special attention ,  such 
as the .promotion of agriculture , controlling of inflation,  and 
the curbing of wasteful import spending, all seem to indicate 
that as Nigeria nears the end of military rule and returns to 
a democratic political process , the hopes for a stable and sound 
economic system. (which Lipset and others would contend is ne­
cessary in order to maintain a democratic form of government ) 
in the future is a very attainable goal and depends to a large 
extent on the decisions made in the . future as specific problems 
are encountered , analyzed , and possible solutions proposed . 
e .  The Military as Agents of Economic Developmen� z 
A second orientation of this paper was an evaluation of 
the military regimes in the 1970s as agents of development within 
the Nigerian context . McKinlay and Cohan ' s  surveys of military 
. . . 
and nonmilitary regimes throughout the developing world over 
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the past twenty years seemed to indicate that one could expect 
neither signficantly higher levels of economic development under 
a military regime or significantly lower levels , although some of 
their findings did seem to indicate that military regimes exper­
ienced l&ss success in the international trading system. However ,  
in the Nigerian case-study, the fact that the nation possesses 
. ' such a valuable primary commodity as petroleum at a time in the 
history of the world when that commodity is in . high demand and 
diminishing supplies , seems to have offset any negative encounters 
by the Nigerian military regime in international trade . 
If we are to once again refer to the goals of any political 
system as described earlier within the guidelines p11t forth by 
Potholm , then this is one method of evaluat.ing the overall sue-
cess of the military regimes in Nigeria during the 1970s . The 
survival of the Nigerian political-economic system has definitely 
been realized as the ending of the Civil War marked the conclusion 
of significant and overt conflicts between the ma j or regions and 
ethnic groupings and no significant uprisings have occurred in 
the interim period . The goal of freedom, as mentioned previously, 
as become · a relative concept in ·today ' s interdependent political 
and economic systems and particularly so for the developing na­
tions o.f the world , who must depend on essential inputs and as­
sistance from the industrialized world in order to realize their 
own developmental scheme s .  Nigeria has been fortunate to have 
possessed ample petroleum reserves and this has enabled the nation 
some degree of leverage in international affairs , and more par-
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ticularly, in sub-Saharan African affairs . 
Stability , political , and economic development are also goals 
of the political system as described by Potholm . Stability has 
definitely been achieved within Nigeria and ·the economic data 
seems to indicate that . with careful planning the continued eco­
nomic development of the nation should continue throughout the 
· 1980s . With the return to a democratic form of government in 
September, 1979 , it would also appear that some degree of pol­
itical development has also been realized . For those who doubt 
the sincerity of the military' s commitment towards relinquishing 
political control ,  the information supplied by Bienen seems to 
indicate that the military, since 1967,  has been making a con-
scious effort to incorporate civilians in all levels of govern­
ment and in decision making positions as well as merely admin­
istrative one s .  
Bienen went further in his surveys and conducted polls , 
although they were limited to the Western Region, concerning the 
opinions of the general populace regarding the efforts of the 
military in the areas of economic and political development . In-
' 
terestingly enough , the resul.ts seem" to indicate that the ma-
jority of those surveyed felt that the military government in 
Nigeria was no more successful at the promoting of economic 
development or political stability with the opinions of many 
individuals that the military itself displayed as much internal 
instability as had pervious civilan regime s .  ( Bienen, 1978 , 
p .  220 ) .  
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International objectives of the Nigerian nation have been 
achieved to a certain extent , particularly as concerns its in­
volvements in sub-Saharan issue s .  With the elecion of Jimmy 
Carter in the United States in 1976 , the relati ons between Ni-
geria and the Americans have improved and the Western world as 
a whole has come to accept the nation as one of the most serious 
' 
spokesmen for the African continent . 
The abilities of the military regimes to exploit the re­
sources of the nation have been questionable ,  although once again 
there can be no doupt that some progress has been achieved . In 
terms of its regulative capacity , the government has maintained 
order during its interim rule and has for the most part been ac­
cepted as a temporary legitimate governing. pody, although this 
acceptance has always been contingent on the promises of the 
eventual return to a civilian form of government. 
The extractive capability of the military has not been ut­
ilized to the best possible extent as figures regarding production 
(both industrial as well as agricultural )  seem to indicate that 
the military has not been particularly innovative as concerns the 
promotion of development in those specific 'areas . Serious pro­
blems remain unsolved in the area of transportation infrastruc­
.ture s ,  although it does appear that the military has finally re­
alized the specific deficiencies and has in the past few years 
devoted more investment capital in those areas . 
An attempt at the equal distribution of the benefits of 
industrialization appears to have been seriously undertaken with 
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the policies of import substituion and Nigerianization and the 
limits placed on individual ownership by Nigerians . Also by 
making access to education open to all Nigerians the government 
is pursuing what it believes is the best opportunity to ensure 
an equal opportunity and equal success of social mobility for 
all Nigerians.  Yet ethnicity prevails in both the political 
and economic systems ana remains a impediment to mobility be­
tween regions and also still places constraints on upward mo­
bility within ethnic groupings . 
In terms of its re juven�tive capicity , it does appear that 
the military government has constantly readjusted its policies 
and priorities to correspond with the real needs and the real 
capabilities of the Nigerian economic system. The symbolic ca­
pability of the in the eyes of the world community has been for 
the most part a positive expression ,  again due in part to the 
valuable petroleum reserves which that nation possesses . 
. In his conclusions from studying military regimes ,  Potholm 
has determined that the military offers a system of rule which 
is no more stable than civilian regimes ,  there is no less evi­
dence of corruption in military governments ,  in general there 
is a lack of success in the promotion of economic deve lopment , and 
while the origin and style of the e lites has differe d ,  the out­
puts in general have . not , again reaffirming to a certain extent , 
the findings of McKinlay and Cohan. The success of the Nigerian 
military regime has been due largely to the nature of the mili­
tary intervention in domestic politics .  The military became 
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involved in the domestic politics only when the total collapse 
of the nation was threatene d .  and from the onset of their take-
over they never intended for their rule to be more than an in­
terim one , until political and economic stability could be achieved . 
3 .  Has Political Development Occurred in the 19ZOs i 
As a paper written by a political scientist , the major 
' 
concern with the success or failure of the economic policies of 
the military regimes in Nigeria during the 1970s should be dir­
ectly related t o  whether or not comparable political develop­
ment has also taken place . The return to a democratic form of 
government in September, 1979 , seems to indicate that indeed 
political development , if we are to use the guidelines set forth 
by We lch and others , has indeed been accompan¥ing the economic 
development of the Nigerian nation. However ,  many are still 
doubtful due to the fact that similar promises of a return of 
the military to the barracks have in the past been reneged upon 
throughout the aeveloping world . However, the data supplied by 
Bienen which indicates that a definite effort has been undertaken 
to incorporate civilians into responsible governmental positions 
since 1967,  indicates that from the . onset of its rule , the mili­
tary has attempted to prepare for an eventual resumption of a 
civilian form of government . 
Bienen also found from his studies that the African military 
is less insulated from the rest of society than are military re­
gimes in other developing countries and that the professionaliza-
- ' . 
tion of African military organizations is not as high as those of 
-91-
other nations . (Bienen, 1978. p. 207 ) .  The fact that the Ni­
gerian army is the largest in terms of numbers within the African 
continent and the fact that Nigerian budgets allocate a dispro­
��rtionate share of investments to the military. would seem to 
detract from some of Bienen' s conclusions regarding ·the propen­
sity for the military to relinquish control to civilians in the 
\ 
September , 19?9 . elections . However ,  further information sup­
plied by McKinlay and Cohan indicates that the resource level of 
a military organization does not appear to influence the degree 
of civilianization and military regimes with larger and more 
expensive armies do not resist civilianization to any greater of 
an extent than do those regimes less endowe d .  (McKinlay and Co­
han, 19?6 , p .  300 ) .  
In condluding , it does appear that definite strides towards 
the economic deve lopment of the Nigerian nation have ta.ken place 
during tPe 1970s. If one is to accept Lipset ' s  contention that 
political deve lopment and economic development are stro�gly cor­
related , and if one accepts the findings of Bienen, McKinlay, 
and Cohan , then it also appears that definite progress towards 
political development has also occurred within the nation of Ni-
\ 
geria. Serious problems do remain , both economic in terms of 
declining agricu·l tural production, and political in terms of the 
prevalence of ethnicity in political and economic areas . The ef­
forts of the military to expose the ethnic groups to additional 
cross-pressures by subdividing . the nation into nineteen states 
and the promoting of equal access to education appear to be aimed 
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at reducing the potentials for ethnic conflicts within the pol­
itcal arena once a return to civilian government takes plac e .  
Whether or not t e n  years has been a long enough time to erase 
centu�ies of ethnic rivalries remains a serious question, and 
only by observing the political developments within Nigeria after 
the September e lections take place can one effectively attempt · 
to evaluate the role of the military regimes during the 1970s 
in the promotion of political as well as economic development . 
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